From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71D1DC46470 for ; Tue, 7 Aug 2018 07:43:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 141B521A03 for ; Tue, 7 Aug 2018 07:43:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="vSgh2gFD" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 141B521A03 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388904AbeHGJ4K (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Aug 2018 05:56:10 -0400 Received: from mail-lf1-f68.google.com ([209.85.167.68]:33718 "EHLO mail-lf1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728125AbeHGJ4J (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Aug 2018 05:56:09 -0400 Received: by mail-lf1-f68.google.com with SMTP id u14-v6so10956952lfu.0; Tue, 07 Aug 2018 00:43:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=omdZqfutPZ16RnM0rLKihE/eIq/+PgGpIY13c/+Cwk0=; b=vSgh2gFDPArWChSoSZFDPbnsGRgAxoMtmSRNX67AYgfEzX//BlY2jR3ka3jhD0pbc9 Ovr/A8Y5yZJQAmsLjFQYL9yAOygh/PQGcVyEKZSVxNzd9EPJ8bp2G8Wdp3uRhMGIdhqz Xn2bWB+jCyP51l9BmiFxDC4dcP3kCsS0KesJlGD+AnKSAZ8taLENYXU8bbiAU4ObBumC twbvoNoVXQGC3XjdFMhCl9/IlMVdsAF5AIGVyeKasxCitfN7WL/8HR4KgwdhsC9bcx0f 0BGBEo0vlDzSyYH0jBJbeebQehooqIAEgdmWfEd7QV2ZyIGyd/WocSbI0b6IQqywoMMe TiTQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=omdZqfutPZ16RnM0rLKihE/eIq/+PgGpIY13c/+Cwk0=; b=rS3ouzFX6/Y/+gJoVNgT6XsCd9n35PhFbS6AWynhhPyo7I7ivVmHIzKHLqAJPJ2nhh IsnVEnfvmRl27OL0ifg6Jg82ytseMLuxCYNTNXWw/irUAq5CSemGrueDIxCbBO6i+Ms2 gma2ypKSVT+2RPT5cWZb9cd2tmrEc2bJMfW3K6B5e6VnxTyryB/g0YgOOO1fvlk3BgLs 8V5X/FgEjnsLPKQHrnlCwBp1IYJ0I8uuL0SdpGej2hUF0vLCO00boWQLqP+r7uc81ZOq t6wGJxMhsiGuDQwYrWmQdCvnPf43HgIqBFjrSVdPz2Z7Uwf+eM7XAFZ8xez2gr5ppIjJ NalQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlGALCoVHbvfSf87lSQLnEIB/CMIFnknFYKbrBfamafbCUSrFMsI Zme4GpgXHh5AdZavTfGAnhzjVN86QORdWv2yggY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpeVP3u3IARnoNGQjZVwwI72/UKJW3CK2QFmiPEzm5xmr7tgLWVCKH+ojdcc1SS2TImhw0bKKnr6WNjPnXosqyM= X-Received: by 2002:a19:a685:: with SMTP id p127-v6mr14215255lfe.4.1533627783738; Tue, 07 Aug 2018 00:43:03 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> <1532590246.7411.3.camel@suse.com> <20180806075754.GA12124@chenyu-desktop> <1533550820.15815.14.camel@suse.com> <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> In-Reply-To: <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> From: Ryan Chen Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 15:49:06 +0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption To: Chen Yu Cc: oneukum@suse.com, Pavel Machek , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , jlee@suse.com, "Theodore Ts'o" , smueller@chronox.de, denkenz@gmail.com, Linux PM list , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , kookoo.gu@intel.com, Zhang Rui Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 3:33 PM Yu Chen wrote: > > On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 12:20:20PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Mo, 2018-08-06 at 15:57 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > > Hi Oliver, > > > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > > > > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > > > > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > > > > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > > > > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html > > > > > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from > > > > > user space. > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data > > > > safe while the system is inoperative. > > > > > > Humm, I did not quite get the point here, let's take fscrypt > > > > While the system is running and the fs is mounted, your data > > is as secure as root access to your machine, right? You encrypt > > a disk primarily so data cannot be recovered (and altered) while > > the system is not running. > > > > Secure Boot does not trust root fully. There is a cryptographic > > chain of trust and user space is not part of it. > > > Okay, I see. So if we want to use secure boot mechanism for > hibernation encryption, user space is trusted. s/ is trusted/is not trusted/