From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
"zhujianwei (C)" <zhujianwei7@huawei.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>,
Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Hehuazhen <hehuazhen@huawei.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 17:25:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez0-jSSaw85=ku35UM3vMe98Vz97B68LsUoNd8ftwpunkQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200616074934.1600036-4-keescook@chromium.org>
On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 9:49 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> For systems that provide multiple syscall maps based on architectures
> (e.g. AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 and AUDIT_ARCH_I386 via CONFIG_COMPAT), allow
> a fast way to pin the process to a specific syscall mapping, instead of
> needing to generate all filters with an architecture check as the first
> filter action.
This seems reasonable; but can we maybe also add X86-specific handling
for that X32 mess? AFAIK there are four ways to do syscalls with
AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64:
1. normal x86-64 syscall, X32 bit unset (native case)
2. normal x86-64 syscall, X32 bit set (for X32 code calling syscalls
with no special X32 version)
3. x32-specific syscall, X32 bit unset (never happens legitimately)
4. x32-specific syscall, X32 bit set (for X32 code calling syscalls
with special X32 version)
(I got this wrong when I wrote the notes on x32 in the seccomp manpage...)
Can we add a flag for AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 that says either "I want
native x64-64" (enforcing case 1) or "I want X32" (enforcing case 2 or
4, and in case 2 checking that the syscall has no X32 equivalent)? (Of
course, if the kernel is built without X32 support, we can leave out
these extra checks.)
> +static long seccomp_pin_architecture(void)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + u32 arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
> +
> + /* How did you even get here? */
> + if (current->seccomp.arch && current->seccomp.arch != arch)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + current->seccomp.arch = arch;
> +#endif
> + return 0;
> +}
Are you intentionally writing this such that SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE
only has an effect once you've installed a filter, and propagation to
other threads happens when a filter is installed with TSYNC? I guess
that is a possible way to design the API, but it seems like something
that should at least be pointed out explicitly.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-17 15:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-16 7:49 [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 1/8] selftests/seccomp: Improve calibration loop Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 2/8] seccomp: Use pr_fmt Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 3/8] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE Kees Cook
2020-06-16 16:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:25 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2020-06-17 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:31 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 4/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 12:14 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 18:36 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 21:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 14:40 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-16 16:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 5/8] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86: Provide API for local kernel TLB flushing Kees Cook
2020-06-16 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86: Enable seccomp constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 8/8] [DEBUG] seccomp: Report bitmap coverage ranges Kees Cook
2020-06-16 17:01 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 18:35 ` Kees Cook
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