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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	"Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	syzbot <syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 22:23:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2Og6fWUKZbNO5EtYK-jS+J8rf6r+rOyfUp1MUuy4kMyA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201026200715.170261-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 9:08 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
> names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
> in sockaddr_alg.

That's not true; it's still limited by the size of struct
sockaddr_storage (128 bytes total for the entire address). If you make
it longer, __copy_msghdr_from_user() will silently truncate the size.

> This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
> which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
> is still located within the sockaddr structure.  It would only be
> defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
> (either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
> these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
>
> We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
> break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
> sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
> sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
>
> One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
> when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'.  However, that would keep userspace without an
> easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
>
> Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
> array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
> Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
[...]
> @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
>         const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
>         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
>         struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> -       struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr;
> +       struct sockaddr_alg_new *sa = (void *)uaddr;
>         const struct af_alg_type *type;
>         void *private;
>         int err;
> @@ -155,7 +155,11 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
>         if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
> -       if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa))
> +       BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg_new, salg_name) !=
> +                    offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name));
> +       BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name) != sizeof(*sa));
> +
> +       if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1)
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
>         /* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */
> @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
>         sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0;
> -       sa->salg_name[sizeof(sa->salg_name) + addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
> +       sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;

This looks like an out-of-bounds write in the case `addr_len ==
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)`.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-26 21:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-16  8:12 UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind syzbot
2020-10-17  3:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-17  6:20   ` Jann Horn
2020-10-17 10:50   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-17 11:02     ` Jann Horn
2020-10-17 14:41       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-26 20:07         ` [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 21:21           ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:10             ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:40               ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 21:23           ` Jann Horn [this message]
2020-10-26 21:56             ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 22:40               ` Jann Horn
2020-11-06  7:01           ` Herbert Xu
2020-11-02  2:17 ` UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind syzbot

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