From: Jann Horn <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: Stefano Garzarella <email@example.com>, Kees Cook <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Christian Brauner <email@example.com>, Sargun Dhillon <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Aleksa Sarai <email@example.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Stefan Hajnoczi <email@example.com>, Jeff Moyer <firstname.lastname@example.org>, io-uring <email@example.com>, kernel list <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Kernel Hardening <email@example.com> Subject: Re: [RFC] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 11:04:06 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAG48ez3kdNKjif==MbX36cKNYDpZwEPMZaJQ1rrpXZZjGZwbKw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredhat> +Kees, Christian, Sargun, Aleksa, kernel-hardening for their opinions on seccomp-related aspects On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 4:24 PM Stefano Garzarella <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > Hi Jens, > Stefan and I have a proposal to share with io_uring community. > Before implementing it we would like to discuss it to receive feedbacks and > to see if it could be accepted: > > Adding restrictions to io_uring > ===================================== > The io_uring API provides submission and completion queues for performing > asynchronous I/O operations. The queues are located in memory that is > accessible to both the host userspace application and the kernel, making it > possible to monitor for activity through polling instead of system calls. This > design offers good performance and this makes exposing io_uring to guests an > attractive idea for improving I/O performance in virtualization. [...] > Restrictions > ------------ > This document proposes io_uring API changes that safely allow untrusted > applications or guests to use io_uring. io_uring's existing security model is > that of kernel system call handler code. It is designed to reject invalid > inputs from host userspace applications. Supporting guests as io_uring API > clients adds a new trust domain with access to even fewer resources than host > userspace applications. > > Guests do not have direct access to host userspace application file descriptors > or memory. The host userspace application, a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) such > as QEMU, grants access to a subset of its file descriptors and memory. The > allowed file descriptors are typically the disk image files belonging to the > guest. The memory is typically the virtual machine's RAM that the VMM has > allocated on behalf of the guest. > > The following extensions to the io_uring API allow the host application to > grant access to some of its file descriptors. > > These extensions are designed to be applicable to other use cases besides > untrusted guests and are not virtualization-specific. For example, the > restrictions can be used to allow only a subset of sqe operations available to > an application similar to seccomp syscall whitelisting. > > An address translation and memory restriction mechanism would also be > necessary, but we can discuss this later. > > The IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode > ---------------------------------------- > The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode permanently > installs a feature whitelist on an io_ring_ctx. The io_ring_ctx can then be > passed to untrusted code with the knowledge that only operations present in the > whitelist can be executed. This approach of first creating a normal io_uring instance and then installing restrictions separately in a second syscall means that it won't be possible to use seccomp to restrict newly created io_uring instances; code that should be subject to seccomp restrictions and uring restrictions would only be able to use preexisting io_uring instances that have already been configured by trusted code. So I think that from the seccomp perspective, it might be preferable to set up these restrictions in the io_uring_setup() syscall. It might also be a bit nicer from a code cleanliness perspective, since you won't have to worry about concurrently changing restrictions.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-15 9:04 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-06-09 14:24 Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-14 15:52 ` Jens Axboe 2020-06-15 7:23 ` Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-15 9:04 ` Jann Horn [this message] 2020-06-15 13:33 ` Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-15 17:00 ` Jens Axboe 2020-06-16 9:12 ` Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-16 11:32 ` Jann Horn 2020-06-16 14:07 ` Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-16 15:26 ` Jens Axboe 2020-06-16 16:07 ` Stefano Garzarella 2020-06-15 22:01 ` Christian Brauner 2020-06-15 23:26 ` Jann Horn
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