From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
william.c.roberts@intel.com, serge@hallyn.com,
james.l.morris@oracle.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, paul@paul-moore.com,
Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson@ddn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 07:55:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGH-KgsymFfRqDnmn1kLpWiPtHFkLU3UMKVu=8=NOUwk+qWjmg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1491988018-4120-1-git-send-email-sbuisson@ddn.com>
On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 5:06 AM, Sebastien Buisson
<sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> wrote:
> Add selinux_is_enforced() function to give access to SELinux
> enforcement to the rest of the kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson@ddn.com>
> ---
> include/linux/selinux.h | 5 +++++
> security/selinux/exports.c | 6 ++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
> security/selinux/include/avc.h | 6 ------
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
As currently written this code isn't something we would want to merge
upstream for two important reasons:
* No clear user of this functionality. There needs to be a well
defined user of this functionality in the kernel.
* No abstraction layer at the LSM interface. The core kernel code
should not call directly into any specific LSM, all interaction should
go through the LSM hooks.
> diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
> index 44f4596..1007321 100644
> --- a/include/linux/selinux.h
> +++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
> @@ -24,12 +24,17 @@
> * selinux_is_enabled - is SELinux enabled?
> */
> bool selinux_is_enabled(void);
> +bool selinux_is_enforced(void);
> #else
>
> static inline bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
> {
> return false;
> }
> +static inline bool selinux_is_enforced(void)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
> index e75dd94..016f1e2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/exports.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
> @@ -21,3 +21,9 @@ bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
> return selinux_enabled;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
> +
> +bool selinux_is_enforced(void)
> +{
> + return selinux_enforcing;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enforced);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index e67a526..da2baeb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
> return 1;
> }
> __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
> +#else
> +int selinux_enforcing;
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> index 0999df0..ff98351 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> @@ -19,12 +19,6 @@
> #include "av_permissions.h"
> #include "security.h"
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
> -extern int selinux_enforcing;
> -#else
> -#define selinux_enforcing 1
> -#endif
> -
> /*
> * An entry in the AVC.
> */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index f979c35..1e67e268 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
>
> extern int selinux_enabled;
> +extern int selinux_enforcing;
>
> /* Policy capabilities */
> enum {
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-12 11:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-12 9:06 [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 11:55 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2017-04-12 13:30 ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 13:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 15:19 ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 16:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-13 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-12 13:30 ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 15:11 ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 16:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 17:07 ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 17:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 12:13 ` Stephen Smalley
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