From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754881Ab2BASOi (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Feb 2012 13:14:38 -0500 Received: from mail-gy0-f174.google.com ([209.85.160.174]:63559 "EHLO mail-gy0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754789Ab2BASOg convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Feb 2012 13:14:36 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <7102b0e278af50d27b5d61d1be5faaba1b0a091e.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net> References: <7102b0e278af50d27b5d61d1be5faaba1b0a091e.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net> Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2012 10:14:31 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: EdIiyaQz8EGof6cjw68WQJUFb34 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs From: Kees Cook To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Will Drewry , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Linus Torvalds , Jamie Lokier , john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org, mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk X-System-Of-Record: true Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) > become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of > subverting privileged binaries. > > This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and > uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint. > > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Looking forward to this -- it'll give us a lot more flexibility. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook -- Kees Cook ChromeOS Security