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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 20:02:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+QhU2HOicYKqfNo17n9k6DKgt1upa3O2p1b5Gvn6icbQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74ecd4ec-491b-93d7-4e3f-46f92121130b@canonical.com>

On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 7:14 PM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 09/20/2018 07:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 6:39 PM, John Johansen
>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>> On 09/20/2018 06:10 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 9/20/2018 5:45 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 9/20/2018 9:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>>>>  config LSM_ORDER
>>>>>>>       string "Default initialization order of builtin LSMs"
>>>>>>> -     default "yama,loadpin,integrity"
>>>>>>> +     default "yama,loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
>>>>>> If I want to compile all the major modules into my kernel and use
>>>>>> AppArmor by default would I use
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> or
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor"
>>>>> I was expecting the former, but the latter will have the same result.
>>>
>>> t find having the two be equivalent violates expectations. At least
>>> when considering the end goal of full/extreme stacking, its trivially
>>> the same with current major lsms being exclusive
>>
>> This mixes "enablement" with "ordering", though, and I think the past
>> threads have shown this to be largely problematic.
>>
>> However, with CONFIG_LSM_ENABLED, we get the effect you're looking for, IIUC.
>
> no, I was just stating in a world where we have full stacking those two
> are not equivalent, as I would assume the order of any lsm not listed
> may end up being different.

Right, the ordering would be defined first by runtime (lsm.order=)
followed any missing LSMs then ordered by their order in
CONFIG_LSM_ORDER=, followed by any still missing LSMs then ordered by
their order at link-time (which *may* be Makefile order, but could
change with LTO, etc).

>>>>>> When we have "blob-sharing" how could I compile in tomoyo,
>>>>>> but exclude it without a boot line option?
>>>>> Ooh, yes, this series has no way to do that. Perhaps
>>>>> CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE in the same form as CONFIG_LSM_ORDER? I would
>>>>> totally remove LoadPin's CONFIG for this in favor it.
>>>>
>>>> I would generally prefer an optional CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE to
>>>> CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE, but I understand the logic behind your
>>>> approach. I would be looking for something like
>>>>
>>> +1 on the CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE ove DISABLE
>>>
>>>> CONFIG LSM_ENABLE
>>>>       string "Default set of enabled LSMs"
>>>>       default ""
>>>>
>>>> as opposed to
>>>>
>>>> CONFIG LSM_DISABLE
>>>>       string "Default set of disabled LSMs"
>>>>       default ""
>>>>
>>>> where an empty string is interpreted as "use 'em all"
>>>> in either case.
>>
>> Yes, I like CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE if "empty" means "enable all". Should
>> CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE replace all the other CONFIG-based LSM
>> enabling/disabling?
>
> I don't particularly like "empty" being "enable all". With that
> how would I disable all builtin lsms so that I just boot with
> capability.
>
> An option of all or even * is more explicit and leaves the empty
> set to mean disable everything

Okay, that works. I prefer "all" FWIW.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-21  3:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:04   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:37     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:10   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:14     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:12   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:40     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:45     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  1:10       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  1:39         ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  2:05           ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  2:14             ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  3:02               ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-21 13:19                 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55   ` Kees Cook

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