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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:54:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+jEiRHmbr4_4NXf0X=THGbzj1TsbGDRdVk8UMQ0ipvQQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b0662712-53f4-1293-aa61-f0455301d7cc@digikod.net>

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:15 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>
>
> On 29/03/2017 12:35, Djalal Harouni wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>
>>> @@ -25,6 +30,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
>>>  struct seccomp {
>>>         int mode;
>>>         struct seccomp_filter *filter;
>>> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)
>>> +       struct landlock_events *landlock_events;
>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
>>>  };
>>
>> Sorry if this was discussed before, but since this is mean to be a
>> stackable LSM, I'm wondering if later you could move the events from
>> seccomp, and go with a security_task_alloc() model [1] ?
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> [1] http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-March/000184.html
>>
>
> Landlock use the seccomp syscall to attach a rule to a process and using
> struct seccomp to store this rule make sense. There is currently no way
> to store multiple task->security, which is needed for a stackable LSM
> like Landlock, but we could move the events there if needed in the future.

It does stand out to me that the only thing landlock is using seccomp
for is its syscall... :P

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-18 22:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-28 23:46 [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 13:48   ` kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 21:48   ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-16 21:57   ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 21:58   ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 03/11] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode() Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 15:18   ` kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 22:17   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 22:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:16       ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-18 23:40         ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 22:03           ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 23:58             ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-04-20  1:48             ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:39       ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 22:23   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 22:47     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 22:18       ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-20  1:54         ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 10:35   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-03-31 21:15     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 22:54       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-04-18 22:53   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:24     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:48       ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-10  6:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-04-11  7:19     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:06   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:35     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19  0:02   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 21:51     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 22:02       ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 22:05         ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-20  1:50           ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:53     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:59       ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [PATCH net-next v6 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 15:58   ` kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 23:26 ` [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Kees Cook
2017-04-19  0:12   ` Mickaël Salaün

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