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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Stanislav Kozina <skozina@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: get_arg_page() && ptr_size accounting
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 09:45:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ+aiJWL0G0Zpq2Df4ADEmpSBZHSTaUkzJiNbgg+B6x2Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKYVAfWkd3WTM4EkVHWGoUY9BtSGKMLb1RAKhUfgCVxfA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>> Hi Kees,
>>
>> I was thinking about backporting the commit 98da7d08850fb8bde
>> ("fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers"), but I am not sure
>> I understand it...

BTW, if you backport that, please get the rest associated with the
various Stack Clash related weaknesses:

c31dbb146dd4 exec: pin stack limit during exec
b83838313386 exec: introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()
8f2af155b513 exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions
7bd698b3c04e exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
e816c201aed5 exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec
779f4e1c6c7c Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"
04e35f4495dd exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()
fe8993b3a05c exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing
64701dee4178 exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
473d89639db0 exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
a70423dfbc58 exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
e37fdb785a5f exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
2af622802696 LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
46d98eb4e1d2 commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
c425e189ffd7 binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
a9208e42ba99 exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
ddb4a1442def exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
da029c11e6b1 exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM
98da7d08850f fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers

(and there may be more related to the secureexec changes)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-10 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-10 12:29 get_arg_page() && ptr_size accounting Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-10 16:41 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-10 16:45   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-10 17:21     ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-10 17:43       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-11  4:30         ` Kees Cook
2018-09-11 15:29           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-11  4:27       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-11 15:25         ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-10 17:18   ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-11  4:23     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-11 14:13       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-11 19:06         ` Kees Cook
2018-09-12 12:27           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-12 14:23             ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-09-12 20:42             ` Kees Cook

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