From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
Date: Sun, 25 Jun 2017 12:56:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJEi_CS-CB=-4369TFRyeN4oQdmGS+HV-zoi4rSPpq3Jw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170623015010.GA137429@beast>
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 6:50 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad
> Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based
> on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
> code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
>
> This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with
> their freelist pointers. This adds nearly zero overhead and frustrates the
> very common heap overflow exploitation method of overwriting freelist
> pointers. A recent example of the attack is written up here:
> http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit
BTW, to quantify "nearly zero overhead", I ran multiple 200-run cycles
of "hackbench -g 20 -l 1000", and saw:
before:
mean 10.11882499999999999995
variance .03320378329145728642
stdev .18221905304181911048
after:
mean 10.12654000000000000014
variance .04700556623115577889
stdev .21680767106160192064
The difference gets lost in the noise, but if the above is sensible,
it's 0.07% slower. ;)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-25 19:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-23 1:50 [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation Kees Cook
2017-06-25 19:56 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-06-29 17:05 ` Christoph Lameter
2017-06-29 17:47 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-29 17:54 ` Rik van Riel
2017-06-29 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tycho Andersen
2017-07-05 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-05 23:39 ` Andrew Morton
2017-07-05 23:56 ` Kees Cook
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