linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 07:41:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJq-1Tkfzkh_Na9dGVVi=hARz5yDX68MZoN_KPiNBX5LQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAK8P3a076DEDpzRgTRBNLWan-KZyD0LkauWpuO8RFCf-9i1mhA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 1:27 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>> On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
>>>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
>>>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
>>>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
>>>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
>>>> maintainers due to performance impacts.
>>>
>>> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to
>>> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate
>>> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds.
>>>
>>
>> Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't
>> see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some
>> instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and
>> error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful?
>
> I think the other structs are all small enough:
>
> * thread_info is at most 720 bytes (including crunch+vfp3, which
>   you wouldn't find in one combined kernel) and not randomized
>   at the moment
> * pt_regs is 72 bytes and I don't see how that would be randomized
> * machine_desc would be a candidate for randomizing, but is only
>   108 bytes
> * proc_info_list is 52 bytes and not currently randomized
> * vm_area_struct is randomized but only 96 bytes.
> * task_struct is clearly large enough, but we only use TSK_ACTIVE_MM
>   and TSK_STACK_CANARY, both can be fixed with your trick.

Yup, that matches what I found. task_struct is the only truly giant struct.

>> In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward,
>> since there is no need to preserve the register's value.
>>
>> ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
>>
>> could be replaced with
>>
>> .if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE
>> add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK
>> .endif
>> ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK]
>
> Nice!

Oh, very cool. This'll make it only an asm change in the case where
it's required for randstruct. Perfect. I'll send a patch and carry it
in the randstruct tree.

(In looking at this, it seems tsk_mm is unused in mm/proc-macros.S, so
I'll remove that code unless someone sees something I don't.)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-30 14:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-26 20:17 [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 16:55     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6 Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook
2017-06-29 22:08   ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-29 22:53     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-30  0:04       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-30  7:35       ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30  7:55         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-06-30  8:27           ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30 14:41             ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-06-30 15:22               ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:41   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:09     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-27 22:04       ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  0:43         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-30 10:34       ` James Morris
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:56   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading Kees Cook
2017-05-28  8:12   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 16:59     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 19:24       ` Kees Cook
2017-09-07  7:20         ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-07 22:55           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading Kees Cook
2017-05-28  8:15   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 17:35     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:42   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:03     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28  4:55       ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:44   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] drm/amdgpu: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] drm/amd/powerplay: " Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:47   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:10     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] mtk-vcodec: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] ntfs: Use ERR_CAST() to avoid cross-structure cast Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] ocfs2: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:23   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-26 20:32     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] ACPICA: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:45   ` Christoph Hellwig

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAGXu5jJq-1Tkfzkh_Na9dGVVi=hARz5yDX68MZoN_KPiNBX5LQ@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=nicolas.pitre@linaro.org \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).