From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/15] ima: digest list feature
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 17:08:57 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKjXqn-1j881vYc1F0POPhPJOPZB1w=W_zfgdXTsiyX6A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aec4e72a-7f74-43e7-c226-f51077e7c619@huawei.com>
On Tue, Nov 7, 2017 at 8:45 AM, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
> On 11/7/2017 2:37 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> Normally, the protection of kernel memory is out of scope for IMA.
>> This patch set introduces an in kernel white list, which would be a
>> prime target for attackers looking for ways of by-passing IMA-
>> measurement, IMA-appraisal and IMA-audit. Others might disagree, but
>> from my perspective, this risk is too high.
BTW, which part of the series does the whitelist? I'd agree generally,
though: we don't want to make things writable if they're normally
read-only.
> It would be much easier for an attacker to just set ima_policy_flag to
> zero.
That's a fair point. I wonder if ima_policy_flag could be marked
__ro_after_init? Most of the writes are from __init sections, but I
haven't looked closely at when ima_update_policy() gets called.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-17 1:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-07 10:36 [PATCH v2 00/15] ima: digest list feature Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] ima: generalize ima_read_policy() Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] ima: generalize ima_write_policy() Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] ima: generalize policy file operations Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] ima: use ima_show_htable_value to show hash table data Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] ima: add functions to manage digest lists Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] ima: add parser of digest lists metadata Roberto Sassu
2017-11-18 4:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-18 23:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-20 9:40 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-20 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-20 16:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] ima: add parser of compact digest list Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] ima: add parser of RPM package headers Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] ima: introduce securityfs interfaces for digest lists Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] ima: disable digest lookup if digest lists are not checked Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] ima: add policy action digest_list Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS Roberto Sassu
2017-11-18 4:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] evm: add kernel command line option to select protected xattrs Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] ima: add support for appraisal with digest lists Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] ima: add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 13:37 ` [PATCH v2 00/15] ima: digest list feature Mimi Zohar
2017-11-07 16:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 1:08 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-11-17 8:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-07 14:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-07 17:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-07 18:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-08 12:00 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-08 15:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-09 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-09 14:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-09 16:13 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-09 16:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-09 17:23 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-09 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-07 18:03 ` Safford, David (GE Global Research, US)
2017-11-08 10:16 ` Roberto Sassu
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