From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pmladek@suse.com, luto@kernel.org,
serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM" <linux-audit@redhat.com>,
"open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:CAPABILITIES" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2016 18:00:06 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRjM6FxTrrbFPLu3eupzfMZOWCinHprPye0g0Gq5kuWcQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <878tx79et8.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 9:16 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Not logging capabilities outside of the initial user namespace is
> certainly the conservative place to start, and what selinux does.
FYI, we added some basic userns capability smarts to SELinux in Linux 4.7.
commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f
Author: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Fri Apr 8 13:52:00 2016 -0400
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.
This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.
Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-12 22:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-11 11:14 [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use Topi Miettinen
2016-07-11 15:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-07-11 16:05 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-11 19:28 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-11 17:09 ` Tejun Heo
2016-07-11 19:47 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-12 14:59 ` Tejun Heo
2016-07-13 6:52 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-11 21:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-12 8:54 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-12 13:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-12 22:00 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2016-07-13 7:30 ` Topi Miettinen
2016-07-12 21:56 ` Paul Moore
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-07-03 15:08 [PATCH] capabilities: add capability cgroup controller Topi Miettinen
2016-07-03 16:13 ` [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use kbuild test robot
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