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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	corbet@lwn.net,  zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu,  axboe@kernel.dk,
	agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,  linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v14 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 16:07:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTYoT-XrSp4h5QwT5tnzBS6NHG0XSQ=cKLueM0iM0DvJw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <746a5548-0e98-4953-9e71-16b881c63aa8@linux.microsoft.com>

On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 3:08 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> We could also make security_inode_setsecurity() more generic instead of
> for xattr only, any suggestions?

For the sake of simplicity, since security_inode_setsecurity() doesn't
work, it probably makes more sense to create a new LSM hook rather
than make significant changes to security_inode_setsecurity().

I'm looking at the fsverity hook usage in this patch as well as the
device-mapper hook usage in 13/19 with security_bdev_setsecurity() and
I'm wondering if we could adopt a similar hook as we do with block
devices:

/* NOTE: these are just example values, more granularity would likely
be needed */
enum {
  LSM_INTGR_DIGEST,
  LSM_INTGR_SIG,
} lsm_intgr_type;

/**
 * security_inode_integrity() - Set the inode's integrity data
 * @inode: the inode
 * @integrity_type: type of integrity, e.g. hash digest, signature, etc.
 * @value: the integrity value
 * @value: size of the integrity value
 *
 * Register a verified integrity measurement of an inode with the LSM.
 *
 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
 */
int security_inode_integrity(struct inode *inode,
                             enum lsm_intgr_type type,
                             const void *value, size_t size)

... if the above makes sense, I'd probably adjust
security_bdev_setsecurity() both to have a similar name, e.g.
/inode/bdev/, as well as to take a lsm_intgr_type enum instead of the
character string ... unless we really need a character string for some
reason, in which case use a character string in both places.

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-12 20:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-06 23:34 [RFC PATCH v14 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-03-11 14:25   ` Roberto Sassu
2024-03-11 18:10     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 05/19] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-03-11 14:53   ` Roberto Sassu
2024-03-11 18:34     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 06/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 07/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 08/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 09/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 10/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 11/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-07  0:01   ` Randy Dunlap
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-12  2:57   ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-12  3:07     ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-12 13:12       ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 18:14       ` Fan Wu
2024-03-12 18:51         ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 19:08           ` Fan Wu
2024-03-12 20:07             ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-03-12 18:33     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-07  0:02   ` Randy Dunlap
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-03-07  0:05   ` Randy Dunlap
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-03-06 23:34 ` [RFC PATCH v14 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-03-09  1:14 ` [RFC PATCH v14 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Paul Moore

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