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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 12:38:31 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiP9EAP=JHGKG5LUCusVjVzTQoPVyweJkrX5dP=T_NxXw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210105195937.GX3579531@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 12:00 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
> dentry getting renamed right under us.  And it's possible for
> old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.

This whole thing isn't important enough to get the dentry lock. It's
more of a hint than anything else.

Why isn't the fix to just use READ_ONCE() of the name pointer, and do
it under RCU?

That's what dentry_name() does for the much more complex case of
actually even following parent data for a depth up to 4, much less
just a single name.

So instead of

                       spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
                       audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
                       spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);

why not

                       rcu_read_lock();
                       audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
READ_ONCE(dentry->d_name.name));
                       rcu_read_unlock();

which looks a lot more in line with the other dentry path functions.

Maybe even have this as part of fs/d_path.c and try to get rid of
magic internal dentry name knowledge from the audit code?

                  Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-05 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-04 23:21 [PATCH v4] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU Stephen Brennan
2021-01-05  5:59 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 16:50   ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 17:45     ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 19:59     ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 20:38       ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2021-01-05 21:12         ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 23:25       ` Stephen Brennan
2021-01-06  0:00         ` Paul Moore
2021-01-06  0:38           ` Al Viro
2021-01-06  2:43             ` Paul Moore
2021-01-14 22:51             ` Stephen Brennan
2021-01-06  0:56   ` Stephen Brennan

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