From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jasper Niebuhr <yjnworkstation@gmail.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exitz syscall
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 10:50:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wj1qDhzGRYnfHb-jYHiT_3x+PuA8Zk9FosCzm5OL6e=GQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231112154424.GE35991@mit.edu>
On Sun, 12 Nov 2023 at 07:44, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> How about adding a flag MLOCK_ZERO_ON_FREE used by the mlock2() system
> call? The number of pages which an unprivileged process can lock is
> already capped via RLIMIT_MEMLOCK (or else mlock would be it own
> denial of service attack). That way if process dies from crash, the
> keys would be zero'ed.
Yes, that is a lot better as an interface.
However, it still needs to also make sure that the memory in question
is not file-backed etc. Which the patch I saw didn't seem to do
either.
End result: as it was, that exitz patch was not helping security. It
was anything but.
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-12 18:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-11 12:51 [PATCH] exitz syscall York Jasper Niebuhr
2023-11-11 13:24 ` Willy Tarreau
2023-11-12 1:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-11-12 10:03 ` Jasper Niebuhr
2023-11-12 15:44 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-11-12 18:50 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2023-11-12 19:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-11-13 0:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-11-12 4:52 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-11-13 7:37 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-11-19 14:54 ` Jasper Niebuhr
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