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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] random: get rid of secondary crngs
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 11:26:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9rjNQuBzoenhQ8rh_zep5bW9jRKj2zncTUFSu5dy1smFQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YgN5wp58XHYd7/WA@owl.dominikbrodowski.net>

Hey Dominik,

On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 9:31 AM Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Just one question (which was already present in the past, but...):
>
> > -     WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
> > -     spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
> > -     if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2)
> > -             crng_finalize_init();
> > +     WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies);
> > +     spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
> > +     if (crng_init < 2) {
> > +             invalidate_batched_entropy();
> > +             crng_init = 2;
>
> Might this branch be taken twice if crng_reseed() is called concurrently
> twice? If so, we'd need to increment crng_init while holding the lock,
> such as I suggested in my patch "random: fix locking for crng_init in
> crng_reseed()". But that can be deferred to an additional patch.

Yes absolutely it can and absolutely we should. As a matter of fact,
your patch that you reference was kind of the straw that broke the
camel's back that motivated me to do this patchset now rather than
deferring it. Now we can fix the race you speak of without having to
split the functions and complicate the call graph even more. Do you
think you could rebase your patch on this branch and re-send? I'll
happily apply.

Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-09 10:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-09  1:19 [PATCH v2 0/9] random: cleanups around per-cpu crng & rdrand Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  6:18   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] random: get rid of secondary crngs Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:26     ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-02-21  2:38   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:27     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:23   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:37     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:28   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:40     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:29   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:45     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-15 21:13       ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  2:47         ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:57           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 14:58             ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 19:08               ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-14 18:46   ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-16 23:21     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:37       ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:42         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-21  3:40   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:56   ` Eric Biggers

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