From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Shakeel Butt" <shakeelb@google.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jeffrey Vander Stoep" <jeffv@google.com>,
"Minchan Kim" <minchan@kernel.org>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
"Edgar Arriaga García" <edgararriaga@google.com>,
"Tim Murray" <timmurray@google.com>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Linux MM" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"SElinux list" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:08:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJuCfpHmks2Lxu8j0LaU+yhS3yO62=4qo=Jinr3mK0Km7yguAQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c234a564-a052-b586-2a32-8580aaf8ca5d@redhat.com>
On Fri, Mar 5, 2021 at 9:52 AM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On 05.03.21 18:45, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 5, 2021 at 9:37 AM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 04.03.21 01:03, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 3:34 PM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 3:17 PM Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 10:58 AM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> process_madvise currently requires ptrace attach capability.
> >>>>>> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH gives one process complete control over another
> >>>>>> process. It effectively removes the security boundary between the
> >>>>>> two processes (in one direction). Granting ptrace attach capability
> >>>>>> even to a system process is considered dangerous since it creates an
> >>>>>> attack surface. This severely limits the usage of this API.
> >>>>>> The operations process_madvise can perform do not affect the correctness
> >>>>>> of the operation of the target process; they only affect where the data
> >>>>>> is physically located (and therefore, how fast it can be accessed).
> >>>>>> What we want is the ability for one process to influence another process
> >>>>>> in order to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving
> >>>>>> the security boundary intact.
> >>>>>> Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ
> >>>>>> and CAP_SYS_NICE. PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata
> >>>>>> and CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
> >>>>>> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >>>>>> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
> >>>>>> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> >>>>>> ---
> >>>>>> changes in v3
> >>>>>> - Added Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >>>>>> - Created man page for process_madvise per Andrew's request: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit/?id=a144f458bad476a3358e3a45023789cb7bb9f993
> >>>>>> - cc'ed stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ per Andrew's request
> >>>>>> - cc'ed linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org per James Morris's request
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> mm/madvise.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> >>>>>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
> >>>>>> index df692d2e35d4..01fef79ac761 100644
> >>>>>> --- a/mm/madvise.c
> >>>>>> +++ b/mm/madvise.c
> >>>>>> @@ -1198,12 +1198,22 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec,
> >>>>>> goto release_task;
> >>>>>> }
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS);
> >>>>>> + /* Require PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata. */
> >>>>>> + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
> >>>>>> if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
> >>>>>> ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
> >>>>>> goto release_task;
> >>>>>> }
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> + /*
> >>>>>> + * Require CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance. Note that
> >>>>>> + * only non-destructive hints are currently supported.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> How is non-destructive defined? Is MADV_DONTNEED non-destructive?
> >>>>
> >>>> Non-destructive in this context means the data is not lost and can be
> >>>> recovered. I follow the logic described in
> >>>> https://lwn.net/Articles/794704/ where Minchan was introducing
> >>>> MADV_COLD and MADV_PAGEOUT as non-destructive versions of MADV_FREE
> >>>> and MADV_DONTNEED. Following that logic, MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED
> >>>> would be considered destructive hints.
> >>>> Note that process_madvise_behavior_valid() allows only MADV_COLD and
> >>>> MADV_PAGEOUT at the moment, which are both non-destructive.
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> There is a plan to support MADV_DONTNEED for this syscall. Do we need
> >>> to change these access checks again with that support?
> >>
> >> Eh, I absolutely don't think letting another process discard memory in
> >> another process' address space is a good idea. The target process can
> >> observe that easily and might even run into real issues.
> >>
> >> What's the use case?
> >>
> >
> > Userspace oom reaper. Please look at
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-api/20201014183943.GA1489464@google.com/T/
> >
>
> Thanks, somehow I missed that (not that it really changed my opinion on
> the approach while skimming over the discussion :) will have a more
> detailed look)
The latest version of that patchset is:
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1344419/
Yeah, memory reaping is a special case when we are operating on a
dying process to speed up the release of its memory. I don't know if
for that particular case we need to make the checks stricter. It's a
dying process anyway and the data is being destroyed. Allowing to
speed up that process probably can still use CAP_SYS_NICE.
>
> --
> Thanks,
>
> David / dhildenb
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-05 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-03 18:58 [PATCH v3 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-03-03 23:17 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-03-03 23:34 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-03-04 0:03 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-03-04 1:17 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-03-05 17:37 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-03-05 17:45 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-03-05 17:52 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-03-05 18:08 ` Suren Baghdasaryan [this message]
2021-03-05 18:22 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-03-05 18:36 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-03-05 19:41 ` David Hildenbrand
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