From: Shuah Khan <shuahkhan@gmail.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 10:44:59 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKocOOOMevXWCPgAddo4scC+GY+emw67XxC3vFnOtJM81QxkTA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120904163829.GA23777@srcf.ucam.org>
On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 10:38 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 10:30:46AM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 9:55 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
>> >
>> > This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
>> > could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
>> > We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE capability.
>>
>> Does this mean, acpi_rsdp is disabled on all current platforms that
>> don't support CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE?
>
> No, if you're not using secure boot then you'll have
> CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE.
Gotta say this capability name is confusing. Naming is
CAP_PRE_SECURE_BOOT or something along the lines might be a better
choice. When I just look at this name, I sure thought this
CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE true means it is a secure boot capable firmware.
-- Shuah
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-09-04 16:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-09-04 15:55 [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 01/11] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:00 ` Pavel Machek
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:16 ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:12 ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 20:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 21:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 22:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 23:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 4:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05 5:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 7:00 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05 7:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:39 ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 21:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 15:43 ` Roland Eggner
2012-09-05 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-05 21:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:49 ` Eric Paris
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 08/11] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 09/11] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:30 ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 16:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:44 ` Shuah Khan [this message]
2012-09-04 20:37 ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:50 ` Josh Boyer
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 11/11] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:08 ` [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:07 ` Pavel Machek
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