From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 16:13:39 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUUY8JcWA0xeK1Qt2S5V4kPFUCT3o7Nbfhc41CxRHJLEQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1327967744.5355.35.camel@lenny>
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 3:55 PM, Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 15:15 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>> You can accomplish the same thing *without a scary setuid binary*.
>> The use case doesn't even need a new complicated userspace tool. You
>> would set up an initscript or some /etc/fstab entries and then:
>
> That requires administrative access to the system and custom
> configuration; if you have that, you could just as easily set up a
> wrapper script to run sudo + shell script to do whatever you want for
> example.
>
> That's the role schroot fills now - basically pre-canned scripts, but
> you don't get out of custom configuration or needing root access to set
> it up. And as I mentioned in https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/12/9/213, it's
> not as interesting as you might think even in the model of
> "pre-configure, give out access to regular users", because if you allow
> uploading .debs, it's just an elaborate root shell.
>
> The most interesting thing to me is an entire setup that doesn't require
> administrative access, so you can do it on any server or workstation,
> and I have that with linux-user-chroot.
>
>> no_new_privs chroot /var/chroot/ubuntu_oneiric/ /bin/bash
>>
>> et voila. (Where no_new_privs would be a really simple tool that does
>> PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and then execs its argument.)
>>
>> Maybe it's just me, but I think this is useful and I would, in fact,
>> use it in my regular workflow.
>
> workflow for what? Building software? Let's try to narrow down the
> problem we're solving here.
Building software. I run Fedora and I write software and generate
binaries that need to work on Ubuntu. So I keep an Ubuntu chroot
around. On the occasions when I update the chroot, I have no problem
sudoing from the Fedora side (although this is suboptimal). I
certainly don't need the NSS databases kept in sync, and I'd rather
minimize the complexity of things that run setuid root.
no_new_privs chroot /var/chroot/ubuntu /bin/bash is sufficient for my needs.
If we could have a full fakeroot-like setup supported, that would be
even better. But that isn't likely to happen with a 44-line patch.
Like I said, the chroot patch is an example. I think it has enough
valid usecases to more than justify its minimal complexity. I also
think it's far less important than the core no_new_privs patch, which
enables lots of things beyond just chroot.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-31 0:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-30 16:17 [PATCH v3 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-01 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 21:58 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:41 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:10 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:55 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-31 0:13 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2012-01-30 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:48 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-09 9:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CALCETrUUY8JcWA0xeK1Qt2S5V4kPFUCT3o7Nbfhc41CxRHJLEQ@mail.gmail.com \
--to=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
--cc=amwang@redhat.com \
--cc=avi@redhat.com \
--cc=borislav.petkov@amd.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=daniel.lezcano@free.fr \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=djm@mindrot.org \
--cc=dlaor@redhat.com \
--cc=eparis@redhat.com \
--cc=eric.dumazet@gmail.com \
--cc=gregkh@suse.de \
--cc=jamie@shareable.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=khilman@ti.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mhalcrow@google.com \
--cc=mingo@elte.hu \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=olofj@chromium.org \
--cc=penberg@cs.helsinki.fi \
--cc=pmoore@redhat.com \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=scarybeasts@gmail.com \
--cc=segoon@openwall.com \
--cc=serge.hallyn@canonical.com \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=wad@chromium.org \
--cc=walters@verbum.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).