From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>, "X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 21/21] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2019 10:32:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVJ1vMAA-7qtiZ8tg-3qyckSwbzNC2kbbHsojm+W46PWg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190727055214.9282-22-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 10:52 PM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
>
> The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
> provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
> malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
> inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.
>
> To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
> enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
> default. Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by
> userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0]
> holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file corresponding to
> an attribute that is restricted by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
Looks good to me. Thanks!
> +can use KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute.
Spelling.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-27 17:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-27 5:51 [RFC PATCH 00/21] x86/sgx: KVM: Add SGX virtualization Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 01/21] x86/sgx: Add defines for SGX device minor numbers Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 02/21] x86/sgx: Move bus registration and device init to common code Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 03/21] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device " Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 04/21] x86/sgx: Add /dev/sgx/virt_epc device to allocate "raw" EPC for VMs Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-29 17:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 05/21] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:51 ` [RFC PATCH 06/21] KVM: x86: Add SGX sub-features leaf to reverse CPUID table Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 07/21] KVM: x86: Add WARN_ON_ONCE(index!=0) in __do_cpuid_ent Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 08/21] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops hook to short circuit emulation Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 17:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-30 2:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-16 0:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-19 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20 1:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-20 1:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-30 3:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 10/21] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for VMX/SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 11/21] KVM: x86: Export kvm_propagate_fault (as kvm_propagate_page_fault) Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 12/21] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 13/21] x86/sgx: Move the intermediate EINIT helper into the driver Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 14/21] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 15/21] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 16/21] KVM: VMX: Edd emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 17/21] KVM: VMX: Add handler for ENCLS[EINIT] to support SGX Launch Control Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 18/21] KVM: x86: Invoke kvm_x86_ops->cpuid_update() after kvm_update_cpuid() Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 19/21] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 20/21] x86/sgx: Export sgx_set_attribute() for use by KVM Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 5:52 ` [RFC PATCH 21/21] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 17:32 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
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