From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Jann Horn" <jann@thejh.net>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Graf" <tgraf@suug.ch>, "Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"LSM List" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Network Development" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:36:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVo61UOGHJ6AgrLN_AyzUYuz-JRgET4d6ut-ErwUg_vZA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b9579dae-625e-cd91-0656-821a8d1f2893@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:30 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 2/27/2018 8:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> [ Snip ]
>> An earlier version of the patch set used the seccomp filter chain.
>> Mickaël, what exactly was wrong with that approach other than that the
>> seccomp() syscall was awkward for you to use? You could add a
>> seccomp_add_landlock_rule() syscall if you needed to.
>>
>> As a side comment, why is this an LSM at all, let alone a non-stacking
>> LSM? It would make a lot more sense to me to make Landlock depend on
>> having LSMs configured in but to call the landlock hooks directly from
>> the security_xyz() hooks.
>
> Please, no. It is my serious intention to have at least the
> infrastructure blob management in within a release or two, and
> I think that's all Landlock needs. The security_xyz() hooks are
> sufficiently hackish as it is without unnecessarily adding more
> special cases.
>
>
What do you mean by "infrastructure blob management"?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-27 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-27 0:41 [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-03-11 20:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 02/11] fs,security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 03/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 04/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 4:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 5:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 17:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 17:36 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-02-27 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 21:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 13:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 22:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-11 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 06/11] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 17:35 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 07/11] landlock: Handle filesystem access control Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 23:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-28 0:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 09/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 4:36 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-06 23:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-07 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-08 23:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-08 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-01 22:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-02 0:39 ` Tycho Andersen
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