From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 15:57:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXfDSjgNieM3Q9bVH-7gAePXT=SXWxvzOsyb8xp_2ymQA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190909094230.GB27626@amd>
On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 2:42 AM Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
>
> On Thu 2019-08-29 18:11:35, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > This makes two major semantic changes to Linux's random APIs:
> >
> > It adds getentropy(..., GRND_INSECURE). This causes getentropy to
> > always return *something*. There is no guarantee whatsoever that
> > the result will be cryptographically random or even unique, but the
> > kernel will give the best quality random output it can. The name is
> > a big hint: the resulting output is INSECURE.
> >
> > The purpose of this is to allow programs that genuinely want
> > best-effort entropy to get it without resorting to /dev/urandom.
> > Plenty of programs do this because they need to do *something*
> > during boot and they can't afford to wait. Calling it "INSECURE" is
> > probably the best we can do to discourage using this API for things
> > that need security.
> >
> > This series also removes the blocking pool and makes /dev/random
> > work just like getentropy(..., 0) and makes GRND_RANDOM a no-op. I
> > believe that Linux's blocking pool has outlived its usefulness.
> > Linux's CRNG generates output that is good enough to use even for
> > key generation. The blocking pool is not stronger in any material
> > way, and keeping it around requires a lot of infrastructure of
> > dubious value.
>
> Could you give some more justification? If crng is good enough for
> you, you can use /dev/urandom...
Take a look at the diffstat. The random code is extremely security
sensitive, and it's made considerably more complicated by the need to
support the blocking semantics for /dev/random. My primary argument
is that there is no real reason for the kernel to continue to support
it.
>
>
> are
>
> > This series should not break any existing programs. /dev/urandom is
> > unchanged. /dev/random will still block just after booting, but it
> > will block less than it used to. getentropy() with existing flags
> > will return output that is, for practical purposes, just as strong
> > as before.
>
> So what is the exact semantic of /dev/random after your change?
Reads return immediately if the CRNG is initialized, i.e reads return
immediately if and only if getentropy(..., 0) would succeed.
Otherwise reads block.
--Andy
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-09 22:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-30 1:11 [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 1/7] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 2/7] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 3/7] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 4/7] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 5/7] random: Remove the blocking pool Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 6/7] random: Delete code to pull data into pools Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 7/7] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:49 ` [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-30 2:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-09 9:42 ` Pavel Machek
2019-09-09 22:57 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
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