From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [CFT][PATCH 6/8] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 14:49:32 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXffwu6+yn76FXB2xnk+2GQq5UZSxXokOk8pxsHz6Ye_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87mw6wk12i.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>
> Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> ---
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 ++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 1e34de2fbd60..44a555ac6104 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
>
> static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
>
> static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
> @@ -583,9 +584,6 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map,
> return false;
> }
>
> -
> -static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex);
> -
> static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
> int cap_setid,
> @@ -602,7 +600,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
>
> /*
> - * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
> + * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
> *
> * Any map is only ever written once.
> *
> @@ -620,7 +618,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
> * architectures returning stale data.
> */
> - mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
> + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
>
> ret = -EPERM;
> /* Only allow one successful write to the map */
> @@ -750,7 +748,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> *ppos = count;
> ret = count;
> out:
> - mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
> + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
> if (page)
> free_page(page);
> return ret;
> @@ -845,12 +843,12 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> {
> bool allowed;
>
> - mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
> + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
> /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
> * the user namespace has been established.
> */
> allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
> - mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
> + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
>
> return allowed;
> }
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-12-09 22:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-29 17:26 [PATCH v2] userns: Disallow setgroups unless the gid_map writer is privileged Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 12:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 18:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 19:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:25 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:28 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:30 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/3] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 21:05 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 23:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/7] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/7] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87h9x5ok0h.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:27 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <874mt5ojfh.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/7] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/7] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:10 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/7] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:11 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/7] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 23:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 19:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:36 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/8] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:38 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/8] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/8] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/8] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/8] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/8] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2014-12-09 20:42 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/8] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <971ad3f6-90fd-4e3f-916c-8988af3c826d@email.android.com>
2014-12-10 0:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87wq5zf83t.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <87iohh3c9c.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 1:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <8761dh3b7k.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <878uicy1r9.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:36 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:01 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 13:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 13:53 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-21 7:57 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-03-03 11:39 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 2/2] user_namespaces.7: Update the documention to reflect the fixes for negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:37 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:02 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 14:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 10:11 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-02 21:31 ` Alban Crequy
2015-03-04 14:00 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-09 20:43 ` [CFT][PATCH 8/8] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 16:39 ` [CFT] Can I get some Tested-By's on this series? Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 22:48 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-10 22:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-10 23:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-11 19:27 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-12 6:56 ` Chen, Hanxiao
2014-12-13 22:31 ` serge
[not found] ` <87lhmcy2et.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <20141212220840.GF22091@castiana.ipv6.teksavvy.com>
[not found] ` <8761dgze56.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-15 19:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-15 20:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-15 20:49 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-16 2:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-16 9:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:14 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/7] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:58 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 22:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
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