From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: FSGSBASE causing panic on 5.9-rc1
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 15:07:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXxfZtLSPx+QFMRdnvDE6+zT=Jy8CYX03Va7o8M0VvKng@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200820220507.GA10269@sjchrist-ice>
On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 3:05 PM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 01:36:46PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On Aug 20, 2020, at 1:15 PM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 8/20/20 3:07 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > >> On 8/20/20 12:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > >>>> I added a quick hack to save TSC_AUX to a new variable in the SVM
> > >>>> struct and then restore it right after VMEXIT (just after where GS is
> > >>>> restored in svm_vcpu_enter_exit()) and my guest is no longer crashing.
> > >>>
> > >>> Sorry, I mean my host is no longer crashing.
> > >> Just to make sure I've got this:
> > >> 1. Older CPUs didn't have X86_FEATURE_RDPID
> > >> 2. FSGSBASE patches started using RDPID in the NMI entry path when
> > >> supported *AND* FSGSBASE was enabled
> > >> 3. There was a latent SVM bug which did not restore the RDPID data
> > >> before NMIs were reenabled after VMEXIT
> > >> 4. If an NMI comes in the window between VMEXIT and the
> > >> wrmsr(TSC_AUX)... boom
> > >
> > > Right, which means that the setting of TSC_AUX to the guest value needs to be moved, too.
> > >
> >
> > Depending on how much of a perf hit this is, we could also skip using RDPID
> > in the paranoid path on SVM-capable CPUs.
>
> Doesn't this affect VMX as well? KVM+VMX doesn't restore TSC_AUX until the
> kernel returns to userspace. I don't see anything that prevents the NMI
> RDPID path from affecting Intel CPUs.
>
> Assuming that's the case, I would strongly prefer this be handled in the
> paranoid path. NMIs are unblocked immediately on VMX VM-Exit, which means
> using the MSR load lists in the VMCS, and I hate those with a vengeance.
>
> Perf overhead on VMX would be 8-10% for VM-Exits that would normally stay
> in KVM's run loop, e.g. ~125 cycles for the WMRSR, ~1300-1500 cycles to
> handle the most common VM-Exits. It'd be even higher overhead for the
> VMX preemption timer, which is handled without even enabling IRQs and is
> a hot path as it's used to emulate the TSC deadline timer for the guest.
I'm fine with that -- let's get rid of RDPID unconditionally in the
paranoid path. Want to send a patch that also adds as comment
explaining why we're not using RDPID?
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-20 22:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-19 18:07 FSGSBASE causing panic on 5.9-rc1 Tom Lendacky
2020-08-19 18:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-19 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-20 0:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-20 15:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-20 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-20 16:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 16:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 17:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-20 18:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 18:38 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-20 18:39 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-20 18:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 20:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-20 20:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-20 20:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-20 22:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-20 22:07 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-08-20 22:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-21 0:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-21 1:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-20 18:43 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2020-08-20 13:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-20 17:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
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