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From: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Peter Dolding <oiaohm@gmail.com>,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time
Date: Sun, 8 Apr 2018 21:21:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMp4zn8GOFk9EKCS9JaEsKayDZ+pLFORWBRHPaCCsN--EyvFVg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201804090338.w393crfv005435@www262.sakura.ne.jp>

On Sun, Apr 8, 2018 at 8:38 PM, Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> Suggested changes on top of your patch:
>
>   Replace "struct hlist_head *head" in "struct security_hook_list" with
>   "const unsigned int offset" because there is no need to initialize with
>   address of the immutable/mutable chains.
>
>   Remove LSM_HOOK_INIT_MUTABLE() by embedding just offset (in bytes) from
>   head of "struct security_hook_heads" into "struct security_hook_list"->offset.
>
>   Make "struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" and
>   "struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads_mutable" local variables.
>
>   Rename "struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" to
>   "struct security_hook_heads security_mutable_hook_heads" and mark it as
>   __ro_after_init.
>
>   Add the fourth argument to security_add_hooks() which specifies to which
>   chain (security_{mutable|immutable}_hook_heads) to connect.
>
>   Make all built-in LSM modules (except SELinux if
>   CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=y) be connected to
>   security_immutable_hook_heads.
>
>   Rename __lsm_ro_after_init to __selinux_ro_after_init which is local to
>   SELinux.
>
>   Mark "struct security_hook_list"->hook const because it won't change.
>
>   Mark "struct security_hook_list"->lsm const because none of
>   security_add_hooks() callers are ready to modify the third argument.
>
>   Remove SECURITY_HOOK_COUNT and "struct security_hook_list"->owner and
>   the exception in randomize_layout_plugin.c because preventing module
>   unloading won't work as expected.
>

Rather than completely removing the unloading code, might it make
sense to add a BUG_ON or WARN_ON, in security_delete_hooks if
allow_unload_module is false, and owner is not NULL?

  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-09  4:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-08  6:59 [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time Sargun Dhillon
2018-04-09  3:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-09  4:21   ` Sargun Dhillon [this message]
2018-04-09  5:25     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-10 21:24       ` Sargun Dhillon
2018-04-11 14:17         ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-11 21:36           ` Paul Moore

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