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From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
To: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"open list:HID CORE LAYER" <linux-input@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 13:20:53 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANq1E4T6+bacZ9iGREtWiyM8eUkAQoxhgFM6rPrzNRkzAcnfJg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0000000000002d2a5b057a94f7ff@google.com>

Hey

On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 1:25 AM syzbot
<syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit:    ccda4af0f4b9 Linux 4.20-rc2
> git tree:       upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b4e77b400000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=4a0a89f12ca9b0f5
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=72473edc9bf4eb1c6556
> compiler:       gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1646a225400000
> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=108a6533400000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
[...]
> BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)

This uses sendpage(2) to feed data from a file into a uhid chardev.
The default behavior of the kernel is to create a temporary pipe, then
splice from the file into the pipe, and then splice again from the
pipe into uhid.

The kernel provides default implementations for splicing between files
and any other file. The default implementation of `.splice_write()`
uses kmap() to map the page from the pipe and then uses the
__kernel_write() (which uses .f_op->write()) to push the data into the
target file. The problem is, __kernel_write() sets the address-space
to KERNEL_DS `set_fs(get_ds())`, thus granting the UHID request access
to kernel memory.

I see several ways to fix that, the most simple solution is to simply
prevent splice/sendpage on uhid (by setting f_op.splice_write to a
dummy). Alternatively, we can implement a proper splice helper that
takes the page directly, rather than through the __kernel_write()
default implementation.

Thanks
David

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-14 12:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-11 18:26 BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) syzbot
2018-11-14  0:25 ` syzbot
2018-11-14 12:20   ` David Herrmann [this message]
2018-11-14 16:52     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-11-14 17:14       ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:02         ` [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:14           ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 18:18           ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 21:54             ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 21:55             ` [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 22:04               ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:28                 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 22:37                   ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:46                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  0:39                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-14 23:00                   ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 23:20                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  8:14                       ` Benjamin Tissoires
2018-11-15 12:06                         ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:50                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-15 12:09               ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:49                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 12:52               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:21                 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-19 13:26                   ` Jiri Kosina

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