From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-team@android.com, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 09:56:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxhoozGgxYmucFpFx8N=b4x9H3sfp60TNzf0dmU9eQi2UQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191104215253.141818-1-salyzyn@android.com>
On Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 11:53 PM Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> wrote:
>
> Patch series:
>
> Mark Salyzyn (4):
> Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
Sigh.. did not get to fsdevel (again...) I already told you several times
that you need to use a shorter CC list.
> overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
> overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
> overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
It would be better for review IMO if you rebase your series on top of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs.git ovl-unpriv
1. internal getxattr patch would be a one liner change to ovl_own_getxattr()
2. The documentation of override_creds would be much more
meaningful if it used the overlay permission model terminology
that Miklos added in his patch set and extend it
Thanks,
Amir.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-05 7:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-04 21:52 [PATCH v15 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix Mark Salyzyn
2019-11-04 21:52 ` [PATCH v15 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method Mark Salyzyn
2019-11-04 21:52 ` [PATCH v15 3/4] overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking Mark Salyzyn
2019-11-04 21:52 ` [PATCH v15 4/4] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Mark Salyzyn
2019-11-05 7:56 ` Amir Goldstein [this message]
2019-11-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v15 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix Mark Salyzyn
2019-11-05 19:25 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-10-19 11:52 Mark Salyzyn
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