* KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2)
@ 2018-09-28 14:45 syzbot
2018-09-28 14:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2018-09-28 14:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, pmladek, rostedt, sergey.senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs
Hello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: c127e59bee3e Merge tag 'for_v4.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b2f32a400000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dfb440e26f0a6f6f
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=376cea2b0ef340db3dd4
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4
R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c36c66ba by task syz-executor2/27811
CPU: 0 PID: 27811 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #36
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604
vsnprintf+0x48e/0x1b60 lib/vsprintf.c:2293
vscnprintf+0x2d/0x80 lib/vsprintf.c:2396
vprintk_store+0x43/0x510 kernel/printk/printk.c:1847
vprintk_emit+0x1c1/0x930 kernel/printk/printk.c:1905
vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 kernel/printk/printk.c:1963
vprintk_func+0x7e/0x181 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:398
printk+0xa7/0xcf kernel/printk/printk.c:1996
ovl_lookup_index.cold.15+0xe8/0x1f8 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:689
ovl_lookup+0x9f2/0x29c0 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:1022
__lookup_hash+0x12e/0x190 fs/namei.c:1546
do_rmdir+0x3b3/0x630 fs/namei.c:3930
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3959 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3957 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x36/0x40 fs/namei.c:3957
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457579
Code: 1d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 eb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f0e714a6c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0e714a6c90 RCX: 0000000000457579
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4
R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 27811:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3718 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x14e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3727
kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:635 [inline]
kcalloc include/linux/slab.h:646 [inline]
ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x57/0x180 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:596
ovl_get_index_name+0x5c/0x80 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:631
ovl_lookup_index+0xe4/0x700 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:678
ovl_lookup+0x9f2/0x29c0 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:1022
__lookup_hash+0x12e/0x190 fs/namei.c:1546
do_rmdir+0x3b3/0x630 fs/namei.c:3930
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3959 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3957 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x36/0x40 fs/namei.c:3957
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 5441:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3813
__vunmap+0x335/0x460 mm/vmalloc.c:1532
vfree+0x68/0x100 mm/vmalloc.c:1593
copy_entries_to_user net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:870 [inline]
get_entries net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1027 [inline]
do_ipt_get_ctl+0x9eb/0xbc0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1703
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:104 [inline]
nf_getsockopt+0x80/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:122
ip_getsockopt+0x1af/0x240 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1577
tcp_getsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3583
sock_common_getsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:2997
__sys_getsockopt+0x1ad/0x390 net/socket.c:1939
__do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1947 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1947
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c36c6680
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 58 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff8801c36c6680, ffff8801c36c66c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00070db180 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801da800340
index:0xffff8801c36c6380
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0006d16508 ffffea000638a588 ffff8801da800340
raw: ffff8801c36c6380 ffff8801c36c6000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801c36c6580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801c36c6600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ffff8801c36c6680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8801c36c6700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801c36c6780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with
syzbot.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-09-28 14:45 KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) syzbot @ 2018-09-28 14:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2018-09-28 17:39 ` Amir Goldstein 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2018-09-28 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot, Miklos Szeredi, linux-unionfs Cc: LKML, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt, Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 4:45 PM, syzbot <syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > Hello, > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > HEAD commit: c127e59bee3e Merge tag 'for_v4.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.. > git tree: upstream > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b2f32a400000 > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dfb440e26f0a6f6f > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=376cea2b0ef340db3dd4 > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > Reported-by: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com I guess this is overlayfs rather than printk. +overlayfs maintainers In future syzbot will avoid attributing crashes to printk, because I think it's not the first time crashes are mis-attributed to printk: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/41e4b32952f4590341ae872db0abf819b4004713 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140 > RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4 > R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004 > ================================================================== > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c36c66ba by task syz-executor2/27811 > > CPU: 0 PID: 27811 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #36 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS > Google 01/01/2011 > Call Trace: > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 > print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] > kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 > __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 > string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > vsnprintf+0x48e/0x1b60 lib/vsprintf.c:2293 > vscnprintf+0x2d/0x80 lib/vsprintf.c:2396 > vprintk_store+0x43/0x510 kernel/printk/printk.c:1847 > vprintk_emit+0x1c1/0x930 kernel/printk/printk.c:1905 > vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 kernel/printk/printk.c:1963 > vprintk_func+0x7e/0x181 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:398 > printk+0xa7/0xcf kernel/printk/printk.c:1996 > ovl_lookup_index.cold.15+0xe8/0x1f8 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:689 > ovl_lookup+0x9f2/0x29c0 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:1022 > __lookup_hash+0x12e/0x190 fs/namei.c:1546 > do_rmdir+0x3b3/0x630 fs/namei.c:3930 > __do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3959 [inline] > __se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3957 [inline] > __x64_sys_rmdir+0x36/0x40 fs/namei.c:3957 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > RIP: 0033:0x457579 > Code: 1d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 > 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff > 0f 83 eb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 > RSP: 002b:00007f0e714a6c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054 > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0e714a6c90 RCX: 0000000000457579 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140 > RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4 > R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004 > > Allocated by task 27811: > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 > __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3718 [inline] > __kmalloc+0x14e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3727 > kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:635 [inline] > kcalloc include/linux/slab.h:646 [inline] > ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x57/0x180 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:596 > ovl_get_index_name+0x5c/0x80 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:631 > ovl_lookup_index+0xe4/0x700 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:678 > ovl_lookup+0x9f2/0x29c0 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:1022 > __lookup_hash+0x12e/0x190 fs/namei.c:1546 > do_rmdir+0x3b3/0x630 fs/namei.c:3930 > __do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3959 [inline] > __se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:3957 [inline] > __x64_sys_rmdir+0x36/0x40 fs/namei.c:3957 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > Freed by task 5441: > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 > kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 > __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] > kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3813 > __vunmap+0x335/0x460 mm/vmalloc.c:1532 > vfree+0x68/0x100 mm/vmalloc.c:1593 > copy_entries_to_user net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:870 [inline] > get_entries net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1027 [inline] > do_ipt_get_ctl+0x9eb/0xbc0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1703 > nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:104 [inline] > nf_getsockopt+0x80/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:122 > ip_getsockopt+0x1af/0x240 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1577 > tcp_getsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3583 > sock_common_getsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:2997 > __sys_getsockopt+0x1ad/0x390 net/socket.c:1939 > __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline] > __se_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1947 [inline] > __x64_sys_getsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1947 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c36c6680 > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 > The buggy address is located 58 bytes inside of > 64-byte region [ffff8801c36c6680, ffff8801c36c66c0) > The buggy address belongs to the page: > page:ffffea00070db180 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801da800340 > index:0xffff8801c36c6380 > flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab) > raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0006d16508 ffffea000638a588 ffff8801da800340 > raw: ffff8801c36c6380 ffff8801c36c6000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000 > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > Memory state around the buggy address: > ffff8801c36c6580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > ffff8801c36c6600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >> >> ffff8801c36c6680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > > ^ > ffff8801c36c6700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > ffff8801c36c6780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > ================================================================== > > > --- > This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. > > syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See: > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with > syzbot. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "syzkaller-bugs" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to syzkaller-bugs+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/syzkaller-bugs/0000000000003852440576ef80b2%40google.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-09-28 14:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov @ 2018-09-28 17:39 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-24 9:09 ` Dan Carpenter 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Amir Goldstein @ 2018-09-28 17:39 UTC (permalink / raw) To: dvyukov Cc: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, pmladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), sergey.senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Dan Carpenter, Jan Harkes, Jeff Layton, Mark Fasheh On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 5:55 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 4:45 PM, syzbot > <syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > Hello, > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > HEAD commit: c127e59bee3e Merge tag 'for_v4.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.. > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b2f32a400000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dfb440e26f0a6f6f > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=376cea2b0ef340db3dd4 > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > I guess this is overlayfs rather than printk. +overlayfs maintainers > In future syzbot will avoid attributing crashes to printk, because I > think it's not the first time crashes are mis-attributed to printk: > https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/41e4b32952f4590341ae872db0abf819b4004713 > > > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140 > > RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4 > > R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004 > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > > Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c36c66ba by task syz-executor2/27811 > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 27811 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #36 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS > > Google 01/01/2011 > > Call Trace: > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > > dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 > > print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 > > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] > > kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 > > __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 > > string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > > vsnprintf+0x48e/0x1b60 lib/vsprintf.c:2293 > > vscnprintf+0x2d/0x80 lib/vsprintf.c:2396 > > vprintk_store+0x43/0x510 kernel/printk/printk.c:1847 > > vprintk_emit+0x1c1/0x930 kernel/printk/printk.c:1905 > > vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 kernel/printk/printk.c:1963 > > vprintk_func+0x7e/0x181 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:398 > > printk+0xa7/0xcf kernel/printk/printk.c:1996 > > ovl_lookup_index.cold.15+0xe8/0x1f8 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:689 Doh! I used %*s instead of %.s Look how common this mistake is! and I only checked under fs/ [CC: Dan Carpenter and other fs maintainers] Idea for static code analyzers: A variable named *len* is probably not what someone wants to describe the width of %*s field and in most cases I found were %*s is used correctly the string value is a compiler constant (often ""). Thanks, Amir. --- diff --git a/fs/coda/dir.c b/fs/coda/dir.c index 00876ddadb43..23ee5de8b4be 100644 --- a/fs/coda/dir.c +++ b/fs/coda/dir.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static struct dentry *coda_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, unsig int type = 0; if (length > CODA_MAXNAMLEN) { - pr_err("name too long: lookup, %s (%*s)\n", + pr_err("name too long: lookup, %s (%.*s)\n", coda_i2s(dir), (int)length, name); return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); } diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/host.c +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, }; struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.c b/fs/ocfs2/super.c index 3415e0b09398..b74435dc85fd 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int ocfs2_osb_dump(struct ocfs2_super *osb, char *buf, int len) if (cconn) { out += snprintf(buf + out, len - out, - "%10s => Stack: %s Name: %*s " + "%10s => Stack: %s Name: %.*s " "Version: %d.%d\n", "Cluster", (*osb->osb_cluster_stack == '\0' ? "o2cb" : osb->osb_cluster_stack), diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index f28711846dd6..9c0ca6a7becf 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper, index = NULL; goto out; } - pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed inode index lookup (ino=%lu, key=%*s, err=%i);\n" + pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed inode index lookup (ino=%lu, key=%.*s, err=%i);\n" "overlayfs: mount with '-o index=off' to disable inodes index.\n", d_inode(origin)->i_ino, name.len, name.name, err); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index f61839e1054c..c096f12657cd 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static inline int ovl_do_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { int err = vfs_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - pr_debug("setxattr(%pd2, \"%s\", \"%*s\", 0x%x) = %i\n", + pr_debug("setxattr(%pd2, \"%s\", \"%.*s\", 0x%x) = %i\n", dentry, name, (int) size, (char *) value, flags, err); return err; } ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-09-28 17:39 ` Amir Goldstein @ 2018-10-24 9:09 ` Dan Carpenter 2018-10-24 9:35 ` Amir Goldstein 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Dan Carpenter @ 2018-10-24 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Amir Goldstein Cc: dvyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, pmladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), sergey.senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Jeff Layton, Mark Fasheh Hi Amir, Thanks so much for this idea. On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 08:39:15PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 5:55 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 4:45 PM, syzbot > > <syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > > > HEAD commit: c127e59bee3e Merge tag 'for_v4.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.. > > > git tree: upstream > > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b2f32a400000 > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dfb440e26f0a6f6f > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=376cea2b0ef340db3dd4 > > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > Reported-by: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > I guess this is overlayfs rather than printk. +overlayfs maintainers > > In future syzbot will avoid attributing crashes to printk, because I > > think it's not the first time crashes are mis-attributed to printk: > > https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/41e4b32952f4590341ae872db0abf819b4004713 > > > > > > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140 > > > RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0e714a76d4 > > > R13: 00000000004c32cb R14: 00000000004d4ef0 R15: 0000000000000004 > > > ================================================================== > > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > > > Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c36c66ba by task syz-executor2/27811 > > > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 27811 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #36 > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS > > > Google 01/01/2011 > > > Call Trace: > > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > > > dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 > > > print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 > > > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] > > > kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 > > > __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 > > > string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604 > > > vsnprintf+0x48e/0x1b60 lib/vsprintf.c:2293 > > > vscnprintf+0x2d/0x80 lib/vsprintf.c:2396 > > > vprintk_store+0x43/0x510 kernel/printk/printk.c:1847 > > > vprintk_emit+0x1c1/0x930 kernel/printk/printk.c:1905 > > > vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 kernel/printk/printk.c:1963 > > > vprintk_func+0x7e/0x181 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:398 > > > printk+0xa7/0xcf kernel/printk/printk.c:1996 > > > ovl_lookup_index.cold.15+0xe8/0x1f8 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:689 > > Doh! > I used %*s instead of %.s > Look how common this mistake is! and I only checked under fs/ > > [CC: Dan Carpenter and other fs maintainers] > Idea for static code analyzers: > A variable named *len* is probably not what someone wants to describe > the width of %*s field and in most cases I found were %*s is used correctly > the string value is a compiler constant (often ""). > > Thanks, > Amir. > > --- > diff --git a/fs/coda/dir.c b/fs/coda/dir.c > index 00876ddadb43..23ee5de8b4be 100644 > --- a/fs/coda/dir.c > +++ b/fs/coda/dir.c > @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static struct dentry *coda_lookup(struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *entry, unsig > int type = 0; > > if (length > CODA_MAXNAMLEN) { > - pr_err("name too long: lookup, %s (%*s)\n", > + pr_err("name too long: lookup, %s (%.*s)\n", This isn't the right fix because "length" is invalid. > coda_i2s(dir), (int)length, name); > return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); > } > diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c > index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 > --- a/fs/lockd/host.c > +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c > @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct > svc_rqst *rqstp, > }; > struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); > > - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, > (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); > Why wasn't this one applied? It looks correct to me. The rest seem to have been fixed already. I did find one other bug in wireless and I CC'd you on that. I'm going to do a little bit more testing on the check and then push it soon. Thanks again! regards, dan carpenter ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-10-24 9:09 ` Dan Carpenter @ 2018-10-24 9:35 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-24 10:40 ` Jeff Layton 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Amir Goldstein @ 2018-10-24 9:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Dan Carpenter Cc: Dmitry Vyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Jeff Layton, Mark Fasheh > > diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c > > index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 > > --- a/fs/lockd/host.c > > +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c > > @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct > > svc_rqst *rqstp, > > }; > > struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); > > > > - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, > > (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); > > > > Why wasn't this one applied? It looks correct to me. The rest seem to > have been fixed already. > I did not send this patch to Jeff. Jeff was CC'ed on the patch I sent to Miklos and Miklos decided to only take the overlayfs bits: https://marc.info/?l=linux-unionfs&m=153847248625015&w=2 So I guess it has fallen between the cracks. Feel free to send a patch to Jeff. Thanks, Amir. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-10-24 9:35 ` Amir Goldstein @ 2018-10-24 10:40 ` Jeff Layton 2018-10-25 15:02 ` Bruce Fields 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Jeff Layton @ 2018-10-24 10:40 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Amir Goldstein, Dan Carpenter, Bruce Fields Cc: Dmitry Vyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Mark Fasheh On Wed, 2018-10-24 at 12:35 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c > > > index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 > > > --- a/fs/lockd/host.c > > > +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c > > > @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct > > > svc_rqst *rqstp, > > > }; > > > struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); > > > > > > - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > > + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > > (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, > > > (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); > > > > > > > Why wasn't this one applied? It looks correct to me. The rest seem to > > have been fixed already. > > > > I did not send this patch to Jeff. > Jeff was CC'ed on the patch I sent to Miklos > and Miklos decided to only take the overlayfs bits: > https://marc.info/?l=linux-unionfs&m=153847248625015&w=2 > > So I guess it has fallen between the cracks. > Feel free to send a patch to Jeff. > > Thanks, > Amir. Actually, this should probably go to Bruce, as he mostly takes care of lockd. Patch looks correct though. Thanks, -- Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-10-24 10:40 ` Jeff Layton @ 2018-10-25 15:02 ` Bruce Fields 2018-10-25 15:17 ` Amir Goldstein 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Bruce Fields @ 2018-10-25 15:02 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jeff Layton Cc: Amir Goldstein, Dan Carpenter, Dmitry Vyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Mark Fasheh On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 06:40:35AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > On Wed, 2018-10-24 at 12:35 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c > > > > index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 > > > > --- a/fs/lockd/host.c > > > > +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c > > > > @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct > > > > svc_rqst *rqstp, > > > > }; > > > > struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); > > > > > > > > - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > > > + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > > > > (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, > > > > (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); > > > > > > > > > > Why wasn't this one applied? It looks correct to me. The rest seem to > > > have been fixed already. > > > > > > > I did not send this patch to Jeff. > > Jeff was CC'ed on the patch I sent to Miklos > > and Miklos decided to only take the overlayfs bits: > > https://marc.info/?l=linux-unionfs&m=153847248625015&w=2 > > > > So I guess it has fallen between the cracks. > > Feel free to send a patch to Jeff. > > > > Thanks, > > Amir. > > Actually, this should probably go to Bruce, as he mostly takes care of > lockd. Patch looks correct though. Yes, if you could resend I'd be happy to handle it.--b. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-10-25 15:02 ` Bruce Fields @ 2018-10-25 15:17 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-25 16:19 ` J. Bruce Fields 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Amir Goldstein @ 2018-10-25 15:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: J. Bruce Fields Cc: Jeff Layton, Dan Carpenter, Dmitry Vyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Mark Fasheh [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 403 bytes --] On Thu, Oct 25, 2018 at 6:02 PM Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > So I guess it has fallen between the cracks. > > > Feel free to send a patch to Jeff. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Amir. > > > > Actually, this should probably go to Bruce, as he mostly takes care of > > lockd. Patch looks correct though. > > Yes, if you could resend I'd be happy to handle it.--b. Attached. Thanks, Amir. [-- Attachment #2: 0001-lockd-fix-access-beyond-unterminated-strings-in-prin.patch --] [-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 999 bytes --] From 40000f4dcbd5dd18a80efb6aef010f1164985583 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 20:41:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] lockd: fix access beyond unterminated strings in prints printk format used %*s instead of %.*s, so hostname_len does not limit the number of bytes accessed from hostname. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> --- fs/lockd/host.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/host.c +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, }; struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) 2018-10-25 15:17 ` Amir Goldstein @ 2018-10-25 16:19 ` J. Bruce Fields 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: J. Bruce Fields @ 2018-10-25 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Amir Goldstein Cc: Jeff Layton, Dan Carpenter, Dmitry Vyukov, syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4, Miklos Szeredi, overlayfs, linux-kernel, Petr Mladek, Steven Rostedt (VMware), Sergey Senozhatsky, syzkaller-bugs, Jan Harkes, Mark Fasheh On Thu, Oct 25, 2018 at 06:17:25PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Thu, Oct 25, 2018 at 6:02 PM Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > > > So I guess it has fallen between the cracks. > > > > Feel free to send a patch to Jeff. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Amir. > > > > > > Actually, this should probably go to Bruce, as he mostly takes care of > > > lockd. Patch looks correct though. > > > > Yes, if you could resend I'd be happy to handle it.--b. > > Attached. Thanks, queuing it up for 4.20 and stable. --b. > Thanks, > Amir. > From 40000f4dcbd5dd18a80efb6aef010f1164985583 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> > Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 20:41:48 +0300 > Subject: [PATCH] lockd: fix access beyond unterminated strings in prints > > printk format used %*s instead of %.*s, so hostname_len does not limit > the number of bytes accessed from hostname. > > Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> > --- > fs/lockd/host.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/lockd/host.c b/fs/lockd/host.c > index d35cd6be0675..93fb7cf0b92b 100644 > --- a/fs/lockd/host.c > +++ b/fs/lockd/host.c > @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ struct nlm_host *nlmsvc_lookup_host(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, > }; > struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id); > > - dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > + dprintk("lockd: %s(host='%.*s', vers=%u, proto=%s)\n", __func__, > (int)hostname_len, hostname, rqstp->rq_vers, > (rqstp->rq_prot == IPPROTO_UDP ? "udp" : "tcp")); > > -- > 2.17.1 > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-10-25 16:19 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2018-09-28 14:45 KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in string (2) syzbot 2018-09-28 14:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2018-09-28 17:39 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-24 9:09 ` Dan Carpenter 2018-10-24 9:35 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-24 10:40 ` Jeff Layton 2018-10-25 15:02 ` Bruce Fields 2018-10-25 15:17 ` Amir Goldstein 2018-10-25 16:19 ` J. Bruce Fields
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