From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, pjones@redhat.com,
"konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 11:39:49 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D07DE64F-FE8B-4020-8EC2-94C3C0F9920A@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <10bc1017-2b45-43f3-ad91-d09310b24c2c@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> On Aug 27, 2021, at 2:44 PM, Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On 8/25/21 6:27 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
>>
>> Remember, a CA cert is a self signed cert with the CA:TRUE basic
>> constraint. Pretty much no secure boot key satisfies this (secure boot
>> chose deliberately NOT to use CA certificates, so they're all some type
>> of intermediate or leaf), so the design seems to be only to pick out
>> the CA certificates you put in the MOK keyring. Adding the _ca suffix
>> may deflect some of the "why aren't all my MOK certificates in the
>> keyring" emails ...
>
>
> My understanding is the .system_ca keyring should not be restricted only
> to self-signed CAs (Root CA). Any cert that can qualify as Root or
> Intermediate CA with Basic Constraints CA:TRUE should be allowed. In
> fact, the intermediate CA certificates closest to the leaf nodes would be
> best.
With an intermediate containing CA:TRUE, the intermediate cert would not
be self signed. Just for my clarification, does this mean I should remove
the check that validates if it is self signed and instead somehow check if
the CA flag is set? Wouldn’t this potentially allow improperly signed certs
into this new keyring?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-30 17:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-19 0:20 [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:20 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:20 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] integrity: Only use mok keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 11:38 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-19 13:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-19 15:23 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 17:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-23 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 20:48 ` Nayna
2021-08-24 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-25 22:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25 22:27 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-27 20:44 ` Nayna
2021-08-30 17:39 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-01 0:52 ` Nayna
2021-09-01 1:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-02 10:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-01 4:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01 4:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01 4:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:48 ` Eric Snowberg
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