From: Aschwin Marsman <a.marsman@aYniK.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: 2.4.22-pre7: are security issues solved?
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 22:40:35 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0307212234390.3580-100000@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
Hi,
Red Hat has released a new kernel today, that fixes several security issues.
I currently use 2.4.22-pre7, are those security issues solved in this kernel
too? Below are the descriptions from the errata:
> CAN-2003-0461: /proc/tty/driver/serial reveals the exact character counts
> for serial links. This could be used by a local attacker to infer password
> lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password entry.
> CAN-2003-0462: Paul Starzetz discovered a file read race condition existing
> in the execve() system call, which could cause a local crash.
> CAN-2003-0464: A recent change in the RPC code set the reuse flag on
> newly-created sockets. Olaf Kirch noticed that his could allow normal
> users to bind to UDP ports used for services such as nfsd.
> CAN-2003-0476: The execve system call in Linux 2.4.x records the file
> descriptor of the executable process in the file table of the calling
> process, allowing local users to gain read access to restricted file
> descriptors.
> CAN-2003-0501: The /proc filesystem in Linux allows local users to obtain
> sensitive information by opening various entries in /proc/self before
> executing a setuid program. This causes the program to fail to change the
> ownership and permissions of already opened entries.
> CAN-2003-0550: The STP protocol is known to have no security, which could
> allow attackers to alter the bridge topology. STP is now turned off by
> default.
> CAN-2003-0551: STP input processing was lax in its length checking, which
> could lead to a denial of service.
> CAN-2003-0552: Jerry Kreuscher discovered that the Forwarding table could
> be spoofed by sending forged packets with bogus source addresses the same
> as the local host.
Have fun,
Aschwin Marsman
--
aYniK Software Solutions all You need is Knowledge
P.O. box 134 NL-7600 AC Almelo - the Netherlands
a.marsman@aYniK.com http://www.aYniK.com
next reply other threads:[~2003-07-21 20:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-07-21 20:40 Aschwin Marsman [this message]
2003-07-22 7:04 ` 2.4.22-pre7: are security issues solved? Marc-Christian Petersen
2003-07-22 15:02 ` Aschwin Marsman
2003-07-22 15:07 ` Marc-Christian Petersen
2003-07-22 17:01 ` Marcelo Tosatti
2003-07-23 9:56 ` Herbert Xu
2003-07-23 10:35 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 10:39 ` Herbert Xu
2003-07-23 10:48 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 10:47 ` Herbert Xu
2003-07-23 10:50 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 10:59 ` Herbert Xu
2003-07-23 20:16 ` Aurelien Jarno
2003-07-23 20:23 ` Alan Cox
2003-07-23 17:47 ` David Wagner
2003-07-23 11:57 ` Ville Herva
2003-07-23 17:50 ` David Wagner
2003-07-24 9:11 ` Florian Weimer
2003-07-23 12:56 John Bradford
2003-07-23 13:10 ` root
2003-07-23 14:08 John Bradford
2003-07-23 15:46 ` Aschwin Marsman
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