From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261697AbVAMVK7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jan 2005 16:10:59 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261705AbVAMVIQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jan 2005 16:08:16 -0500 Received: from fw.osdl.org ([65.172.181.6]:6635 "EHLO mail.osdl.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261688AbVAMVES (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jan 2005 16:04:18 -0500 Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 13:03:22 -0800 (PST) From: Linus Torvalds To: Alan Cox cc: Dave Jones , Marek Habersack , Marcelo Tosatti , Greg KH , Chris Wright , akpm@osdl.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: thoughts on kernel security issues In-Reply-To: <1105644461.4644.102.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: References: <20050112094807.K24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> <20050112185133.GA10687@kroah.com> <20050112161227.GF32024@logos.cnet> <20050112174203.GA691@logos.cnet> <1105627541.4624.24.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20050113194246.GC24970@beowulf.thanes.org> <20050113200308.GC3555@redhat.com> <1105644461.4644.102.camel@localhost.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 13 Jan 2005, Alan Cox wrote: > > I'm all for an open list too. Its currently called linux-kernel. Its > full of such reports, and most of them are about new code or trivial > holes where secrecy is pointless. Having an open linux-security list so > they don't get missed as the grsecurity stuff did (and until I got fed > up of waiting the coverity stuff did) would help because it would make > sure that it didn't get buried in the noise. Yes. But I know people send private emails because they don't want to create a scare, so I think we actually have several levels of lists: - totally open: linux-kernel, or an alternative with lower noise We've kind of got this, but things get lost in the noise, and "white hat" people don't like feeling guilty about announcing things. - no embargo, no rules, but "private" in the sense that it's supposed to be for kernel developers only or at least people who won't take advantage of it. _I_ think this is the one that makes sense. No hard rules, but private enough that people won't feel _guilty_ about reporting problems. Right now I sometimes get private email from people who don't want to point out some local DoS or similar, and that can certainly get lost in the flow. - _short_ embargo, for kernel-only. I obviously believe that vendor-sec is whoring itself for security firms and vendors. I believe there would be a place for something with stricter rules on disclosure. - vendor-sec. The place where you can play any kind of games you want. It's not a black-and-white thing. I refuse to believe that most security problems are found by people without any morals. I believe that somewhere in the middle is where most people feel most comfortable. Linus