From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1AFAC05027 for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 13:44:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229515AbjBHNoC (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Feb 2023 08:44:02 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43958 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231436AbjBHNnv (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Feb 2023 08:43:51 -0500 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 140764942C for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 05:43:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from cwcc.thunk.org (pool-173-48-120-46.bstnma.fios.verizon.net [173.48.120.46]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 318DgZaj013022 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 8 Feb 2023 08:42:35 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mit.edu; s=outgoing; t=1675863760; bh=xyb6v65nXuHP/xG5TcxP1ne6MztEMsgn/VqCrtkrf9Q=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=HJGrzMDtNqQUvEs34B3TQmwiLMRpnmdRZpR1xMITfSZH5tk/6ZRko4EfF7OKOhx1y CRxNyCkhyDZyyVt6OIIKvX4fS4KCA/VyCNM1lkOh4LFxmKtTyWfD/ySX0j3YZwa8Ti g4/S23TNi1ldNDMrkqWMxMHdgxajG7koDrN0yBEF/MCCNqiMkZFymjtzjYVcDGsSSq rBTqR7ZlYlDEs3ffpZey4lKf+nYs3/Dkt/j69PNO09MnStayU3twnlcUUaJLFIC2p4 9NBO3x5p0r27mi7Q1pMo3JT6T3jxPlq80HMtJ0lnllBU+XpA+2cPLsxKcG+0hiYZlY UjoSRMcr1NgXA== Received: by cwcc.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id E6DF015C35A2; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 08:42:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 08:42:34 -0500 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: "Reshetova, Elena" Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Carlos Bilbao , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Shishkin, Alexander" , "Shutemov, Kirill" , "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" , "Kleen, Andi" , "Hansen, Dave" , Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , "Wunner, Lukas" , Mika Westerberg , Jason Wang , "Poimboe, Josh" , "aarcange@redhat.com" , Cfir Cohen , Marc Orr , "jbachmann@google.com" , "pgonda@google.com" , "keescook@chromium.org" , James Morris , Michael Kelley , "Lange, Jon" , "linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing Message-ID: References: <658272b5-9547-a69f-b6c9-a7ff2dd2d468@amd.com> <20044cae-4fab-7ef6-02a0-5955a56e5767@amd.com> <20230208041913-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Feb 08, 2023 at 10:44:25AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > 2. rest of non-needed drivers must be disabled. Here we can argue about what > is the correct method of doing this and who should bare the costs of enforcing it. > But from pure security point of view: the method that is simple and clear, that > requires as little maintenance as possible usually has the biggest chance of > enforcing security. > And given that we already have the concept of authorized devices in Linux, > does this method really brings so much additional complexity to the kernel? > But hard to argue here without the code: we need to submit the filter proposal first > (under internal review still). I think the problem here is that we've had a lot of painful experience where fuzzing produces a lot of false positives which then security-types then insist that all kernel developers must fix so that we can see the "important" security issues from the false positives. So "as little maintenance as possible" and fuzzing have not necessarily gone together. It might be less maintenance costs for *you*, but it's not necessarily less maintenance work for *us*. I've seen Red Hat principal engineers take completely bogus issues and raise them to CVE "high" priority levels, when it was nothing like that, thus forcing distro and data center people to be forced to do global pushes to production because it's easier than trying to explain to FEDramp auditors why the CVE SS is bogus --- and every single unnecessary push to production has its own costs and risks. I've seen the constant load of syzbot false positives that generate noise in my inbox and in bug tracking issues assigned to me at $WORK. I've seen the false positives generated by DEPT, which is why I've pushed back on it. So if you are going to insist on fuzzing all of the PCI config space, and treat them all as "bugs", there is going to be huge pushback. Even if the "fixes" are minor, and don't have any massive impact on memory used or cache line misses or code/maintainability bloat, the fact that we treat them as P3 quality of implementation issues, and *you* treat them as P1 security bugs that must be fixed Now! Now! Now! is going to cause friction. (This is especially true since CVE SS scores are unidimentional, and what might be high security --- or at least embarassing --- for CoCo, might be completely innocuous QOI bugs for the rest of the world.) So it might be that a simple, separate, kerenl config is going to be the massively simpler way to go, instead of insisting that all PCI device drivers must be fuzzed and be made CoCo safe, even if they will never be used in a CoCo context. Again, please be cognizant about the costs that CoCo may be imposing and pushing onto the rest of the ecosystem. Cheers, - Ted