From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B910C4332F for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 07:44:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230445AbiJTHod (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Oct 2022 03:44:33 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56170 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231164AbiJTHoK (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Oct 2022 03:44:10 -0400 Received: from smtp-out1.suse.de (smtp-out1.suse.de [195.135.220.28]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 38D2B43E65 for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 00:44:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from relay2.suse.de (relay2.suse.de [149.44.160.134]) by smtp-out1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79B8122742; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 07:44:06 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1666251846; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=PHbTH5UTb1JUbjbs4/Uk2iEdLfxd/Mdx2hxMut+87SI=; b=ARfcZvKchIuDTmGoZMMunuibRIM4HBBe1DsWTo3JFC2BlwbOS3HKEyNmtAfX3dqVVsEMoj FJdvT3NZ9tN4K73xaeNk2NjBwjhhJ/ABnuXjnOMyz5h53DaWi8ZtII+1r+b+DecuypvNMZ N+IBiNlfeSJjWGNfeTtMRL6Oa5KBWfw= Received: from suse.cz (unknown [10.100.208.146]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by relay2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F5E52C153; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 07:44:06 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 09:44:05 +0200 From: Petr Mladek To: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Jane Chu , "rostedt@goodmis.org" , "senozhatsky@chromium.org" , "linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , Haakon Bugge , John Haxby Subject: Re: [PATCH] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference Message-ID: References: <20221017191611.2577466-1-jane.chu@oracle.com> <5d987403-a7bf-8996-d639-c99edeaabcdf@oracle.com> <799e5390-2ff5-02b7-2df7-61198d5451e2@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue 2022-10-18 23:49:27, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 08:30:01PM +0000, Jane Chu wrote: > > On 10/18/2022 1:07 PM, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 06:56:31PM +0000, Jane Chu wrote: > > >> On 10/18/2022 5:45 AM, Petr Mladek wrote: > > >>> On Mon 2022-10-17 19:31:53, Jane Chu wrote: > > >>>> On 10/17/2022 12:25 PM, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > > >>>>> On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 01:16:11PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote: > > >>>>>> While debugging a separate issue, it was found that an invalid string > > >>>>>> pointer could very well contain a non-canical address, such as > > >>>>>> 0x7665645f63616465. In that case, this line of defense isn't enough > > >>>>>> to protect the kernel from crashing due to general protection fault > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr)) > > >>>>>> return "(efault)"; > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> So instead, use kern_addr_valid() to validate the string pointer. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> How did you check that value of the (invalid string) pointer? > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> In the bug scenario, the invalid string pointer was an out-of-bound > > >>>> string pointer. While the OOB referencing is fixed, > > >>> > > >>> Could you please provide more details about the fixed OOB? > > >>> What exact vsprintf()/printk() call was broken and eventually > > >>> how it was fixed, please? > > >> > > >> For sensitive reason, I'd like to avoid mentioning the specific name of > > >> the sysfs attribute in the bug, instead, just call it "devX_attrY[]", > > >> and describe the precise nature of the issue. > > >> > > >> devX_attrY[] is a string array, declared and filled at compile time, > > >> like > > >> const char const devX_attrY[] = { > > >> [ATTRY_A] = "Dev X AttributeY A", > > >> [ATTRY_B] = "Dev X AttributeY B", > > >> ... > > >> [ATTRY_G] = "Dev X AttributeY G", > > >> } > > >> such that, when user "cat /sys/devices/systems/.../attry_1", > > >> "Dev X AttributeY B" will show up in the terminal. > > >> That's it, no more reference to the pointer devX_attrY[ATTRY_B] after that. > > >> > > >> The bug was that the index to the array was wrongfully produced, > > >> leading up to OOB, e.g. devX_attrY[11]. The fix was to fix the > > >> calculation and that is not an upstream fix. I see. printk()/vsprintf() is the only code that accesses this pointer. If vsprintf() survives than the system survives. > > As you can see, if the OOBs are NULL, "(null)" was printed due to the > > existing checking, but when the OOBs are turned to non-canonical which > > is detectable, the fact the pointer value deviates from > > (ffffffff84d60aee + 4 * sizeof(void *)) > > evidently shown that the OOBs are detectable. > > > > The question then is why should the non-canonical OOBs be treated > > differently from NULL and ERR_VALUE? > > Obviously, to see the crash. And let kernel _to crash_. Isn't it what we need > to see a bug as early as possible? I do not agree here. Kernel tries to survive many situations when thighs does not work as expected. It prints a warning so that users/developers are aware of the problem and could fix it. In our case, the crash happened when reading a sysfs file. IMHO, it is much better to show (-EINVAL) than crash. The bug when accessing devX_attrY[] does not affect the stability of the system at all. And the broken string might be passed in a very rare case, e.g. in an error path. So that it might be hard to catch when testing. Best Regards, Petr