From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next 1/1] mm: hugetlb_vmemmap: Fix WARN_ON in vmemmap_remap_pte
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 11:50:42 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1piguJXagcxiTpn@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3c545133-71aa-9a8d-8a13-09186c4fa767@arm.com>
On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 02:06:00PM +0530, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
> On 10/26/22 12:31, Muchun Song wrote:
> >> On 10/25/22 12:06, Muchun Song wrote:
> >>>> On Oct 25, 2022, at 09:42, Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com> wrote:
> >>>> From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
> >>>>
> >>>> Commit f41f2ed43ca5 ("mm: hugetlb: free the vmemmap pages associated with
> >>>> each HugeTLB page") add vmemmap_remap_pte to remap the tail pages as
> >>>> read-only to catch illegal write operation to the tail page.
> >>>>
> >>>> However this will lead to WARN_ON in arm64 in __check_racy_pte_update()
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for your finding this issue.
> >>>
> >>>> since this may lead to dirty state cleaned. This check is introduced by
> >>>> commit 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the
> >>>> access and dirty pte bits") and the initial check is as follow:
> >>>>
> >>>> BUG_ON(pte_write(*ptep) && !pte_dirty(pte));
> >>>>
> >>>> Since we do need to mark this pte as read-only to catch illegal write
> >>>> operation to the tail pages, use set_pte to replace set_pte_at to bypass
> >>>> this check.
> >>>
> >>> In theory, the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap
> >>> pages are supposed to be read-only. So, skipping this check for vmemmap
> >>
> >> Tails vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only, in practice but their
> >> backing pages do have pte_write() enabled. Otherwise the VM_WARN_ONCE()
> >> warning would not have triggered.
> >
> > Right.
> >
> >>
> >> VM_WARN_ONCE(pte_write(old_pte) && !pte_dirty(pte),
> >> "%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx",
> >> __func__, pte_val(old_pte), pte_val(pte));
> >>
> >> Also, is not it true that the pte being remapped into a different page
> >> as read only, than what it had originally (which will be freed up) i.e
> >> the PFN in 'old_pte' and 'pte' will be different. Hence is there still
> >
> > Right.
> >
> >> a possibility for a race condition even when the PFN changes ?
> >
> > Sorry, I didn't get this question. Did you mean the PTE is changed from
> > new (pte) to the old one (old_pte) by the hardware because of the update
> > of dirty bit when a concurrent write operation to the tail vmemmap page?
>
> No, but is not vmemmap_remap_pte() reuses walk->reuse_page for all remaining
> tails pages ? Is not there a PFN change, along with access permission change
> involved in this remapping process ?
For the record, as we discussed offline, changing the output address
(pfn) of a pte is not safe without break-before-make if at least one of
the mappings was writeable. The caller (vmemmap_remap_pte()) would need
to be fixed to first invalidate the pte and then write the new pte. I
assume no other CPU accesses this part of the vmemmap while the pte is
being remapped.
--
Catalin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-27 10:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-25 1:42 [PATCH -next 1/1] mm: hugetlb_vmemmap: Fix WARN_ON in vmemmap_remap_pte Wupeng Ma
2022-10-25 6:36 ` Muchun Song
2022-10-26 3:01 ` mawupeng
2022-10-29 1:55 ` mawupeng
2022-11-01 9:56 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-10-26 5:06 ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-10-26 7:01 ` Muchun Song
2022-10-26 8:36 ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-10-26 8:53 ` Muchun Song
2022-10-27 10:50 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2022-10-28 2:45 ` Muchun Song
2022-10-28 15:53 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-01 9:29 ` Muchun Song
2022-10-27 1:42 ` mawupeng
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