From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64564C05027 for ; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:20:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237140AbjAZLUE (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 06:20:04 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37850 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229823AbjAZLUC (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 06:20:02 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 42CFB6592 for ; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 03:20:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 314BE61799 for ; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:20:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CACC5C433D2; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:19:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1674731999; bh=HLNfnERh9yqih9lmJtSKLabo136R/CglFwL3l5Rj5Sg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=B1P0qk7I1ISxzTc2mfP78KRR9qkhlKvXLycdAcYIJgTq7Z4z+GIN6nmkB9rm6iZcK Nu9Wcfup5flrAI+Aw6onJbejHOwFimvel5O7/Z6+LnfBt/c1k1AF4hEp076Sy/mMgs 0Q1UKpiOY7Wqm2lafw0WKMG3Jy0ROLgsHe0cwPJyfY38tFxTQBKNhWhdl+fV7olHVD +FqUZICP/kQVIHUTCgwiVcB1qs4tsrj61CN6QDbM6qnKZ03QCKYezwF1/TxNzLZ0kX 0yn1a8OdrPdl4ohdn1rN6XzpFq8KZTRyOU/IBGnp3MSCMbAjQPjeoRW2pdJAOPVSd2 Xh2nWWqQM0jSg== Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 13:19:55 +0200 From: Leon Romanovsky To: "Reshetova, Elena" Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Shishkin, Alexander" , "Shutemov, Kirill" , "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" , "Kleen, Andi" , "Hansen, Dave" , Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , "Wunner, Lukas" , Mika Westerberg , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Jason Wang , "Poimboe, Josh" , "aarcange@redhat.com" , Cfir Cohen , Marc Orr , "jbachmann@google.com" , "pgonda@google.com" , "keescook@chromium.org" , James Morris , Michael Kelley , "Lange, Jon" , "linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Kernel Hardening Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > Replying only to the not-so-far addressed points. > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:28:13PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > > > Hi Greg, <...> > > > 3) All the tools are open-source and everyone can start using them right away > > even > > > without any special HW (readme has description of what is needed). > > > Tools and documentation is here: > > > https://github.com/intel/ccc-linux-guest-hardening > > > > Again, as our documentation states, when you submit patches based on > > these tools, you HAVE TO document that. Otherwise we think you all are > > crazy and will get your patches rejected. You all know this, why ignore > > it? > > Sorry, I didn’t know that for every bug that is found in linux kernel when > we are submitting a fix that we have to list the way how it has been found. > We will fix this in the future submissions, but some bugs we have are found by > plain code audit, so 'human' is the tool. My problem with that statement is that by applying different threat model you "invent" bugs which didn't exist in a first place. For example, in this [1] latest submission, authors labeled correct behaviour as "bug". [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119170633.40944-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ Thanks