From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-21.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1353CC433DB for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2021 11:27:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B640D64FCB for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2021 11:27:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231877AbhBEL1e (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Feb 2021 06:27:34 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41216 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231453AbhBELWP (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Feb 2021 06:22:15 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-x42c.google.com (mail-wr1-x42c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::42c]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3AD2AC06178A for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2021 03:21:35 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wr1-x42c.google.com with SMTP id l12so7305507wry.2 for ; Fri, 05 Feb 2021 03:21:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=android.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=+Pu2dRMIRwpPR9qhbMs+pqWNrvm5d2PGl86R4BA7oH0=; b=A2iJZnRn7+BDwz6p5b2DECfosa1vn7RxL9AwH+6vu11EKYWH4SJ70UsNmViWGgz6i8 C19CUniK3vNqvfwuGnDcyKP18tsmjpyERU6awEIUtDMG60HaQCM/tBkISzqgsPaybrPj CZrIunYM3MmPFMg383SJR3Bjh6T64f4xjhfWXhb4i3C80IM7CrRYVCEnhh4B+PgEYWBS UOJvQD+5f2ndLY/BDlSRe8x8p9sMDrcMCF1gwYHTnFN6geA+mXrJKoC8R8PAJJYOppIL MfdaRLf/4YXlfF5iqqjagMHKru824pnGFFxxIm1WuWO1TcZbHiikaAMW7/3juO4B9rOD OEDw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=+Pu2dRMIRwpPR9qhbMs+pqWNrvm5d2PGl86R4BA7oH0=; b=HSZYsJU5GVFLQP44YC7RNhSOrKovJEJZL9MnKiPU/HkgtAFYyAzGFBfPsu2uq3I9t3 xpmDM+dcwN8qGByrnNV6xWWw/w8iVSbgUPz3/qxNyuV/k+nH0AnlyS4gg3UnVB4kyijc p/W2DtNWVe8wIYzVn/AZQvX77ZvWt8VZS+lxb8PvfSgceZ2MDU20yARXU5zMedVyBxcD rHHkU/3eej/j2PL8eJMXLLpKHyg3JlLJbklGx1WlFKid6YH9i2V0VOHZTdSP9vnsKzPi dDMZMBWxpNsoU/gphdOKQq5zRjl4OaFp5D7oAh6v4DeXieKUlBHpYTetDt578pSkgLEP 2LSQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532Z+duIW6Ipf/4IQdHT4WJ9zxYHGl8cn5csqaOJPERsXV8KC7Bv 3qqitfE31hjcO9ZmNY1xCdxpJg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwK1MxXHlRk4kJGuhciLBR6WY4TCeUL97PalNZH+SLn5dOFF498ZIQaboYuHhdTM89l3Eh0ew== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:4010:: with SMTP id n16mr4547232wrp.222.1612524094007; Fri, 05 Feb 2021 03:21:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from google.com ([2a00:79e0:d:210:48d2:69e5:c1c:4a83]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d3sm12288142wrp.79.2021.02.05.03.21.33 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 05 Feb 2021 03:21:33 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 11:21:32 +0000 From: Alessio Balsini To: Peng Tao Cc: Alessio Balsini , Miklos Szeredi , Akilesh Kailash , Amir Goldstein , Antonio SJ Musumeci , David Anderson , Giuseppe Scrivano , Jann Horn , Jens Axboe , Martijn Coenen , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Lawrence , Stefano Duo , Zimuzo Ezeozue , wuyan , fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, kernel-team@android.com, "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND V12 7/8] fuse: Use daemon creds in passthrough mode Message-ID: References: <20210125153057.3623715-1-balsini@android.com> <20210125153057.3623715-8-balsini@android.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 05:23:56PM +0800, Peng Tao wrote: > On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 11:31 PM Alessio Balsini wrote: > > > > When using FUSE passthrough, read/write operations are directly > > forwarded to the lower file system file through VFS, but there is no > > guarantee that the process that is triggering the request has the right > > permissions to access the lower file system. This would cause the > > read/write access to fail. > > > > In passthrough file systems, where the FUSE daemon is responsible for > > the enforcement of the lower file system access policies, often happens > > that the process dealing with the FUSE file system doesn't have access > > to the lower file system. > > Being the FUSE daemon in charge of implementing the FUSE file > > operations, that in the case of read/write operations usually simply > > results in the copy of memory buffers from/to the lower file system > > respectively, these operations are executed with the FUSE daemon > > privileges. > > > > This patch adds a reference to the FUSE daemon credentials, referenced > > at FUSE_DEV_IOC_PASSTHROUGH_OPEN ioctl() time so that they can be used > > to temporarily raise the user credentials when accessing lower file > > system files in passthrough. > > The process accessing the FUSE file with passthrough enabled temporarily > > receives the privileges of the FUSE daemon while performing read/write > > operations. Similar behavior is implemented in overlayfs. > > These privileges will be reverted as soon as the IO operation completes. > > This feature does not provide any higher security privileges to those > > processes accessing the FUSE file system with passthrough enabled. This > > is because it is still the FUSE daemon responsible for enabling or not > > the passthrough feature at file open time, and should enable the feature > > only after appropriate access policy checks. > > > > Signed-off-by: Alessio Balsini > > --- > > fs/fuse/fuse_i.h | 5 ++++- > > fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 11 +++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h > > index c4730d893324..815af1845b16 100644 > > --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h > > +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h > > @@ -182,10 +182,13 @@ struct fuse_release_args; > > > > /** > > * Reference to lower filesystem file for read/write operations handled in > > - * passthrough mode > > + * passthrough mode. > > + * This struct also tracks the credentials to be used for handling read/write > > + * operations. > > */ > > struct fuse_passthrough { > > struct file *filp; > > + struct cred *cred; > > }; > > > > /** FUSE specific file data */ > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c > > index c7fa1eeb7639..24866c5fe7e2 100644 > > --- a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c > > +++ b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c > > @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb_fuse, > > struct iov_iter *iter) > > { > > ssize_t ret; > > + const struct cred *old_cred; > > struct file *fuse_filp = iocb_fuse->ki_filp; > > struct fuse_file *ff = fuse_filp->private_data; > > struct file *passthrough_filp = ff->passthrough.filp; > > @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb_fuse, > > if (!iov_iter_count(iter)) > > return 0; > > > > + old_cred = override_creds(ff->passthrough.cred); > > if (is_sync_kiocb(iocb_fuse)) { > > ret = vfs_iter_read(passthrough_filp, iter, &iocb_fuse->ki_pos, > > iocb_to_rw_flags(iocb_fuse->ki_flags, > > @@ -77,6 +79,7 @@ ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb_fuse, > > if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) > > fuse_aio_cleanup_handler(aio_req); > > } > > + revert_creds(old_cred); > cred should be reverted when kmalloc() fails above. > > Cheers, > Tao > -- > Into Sth. Rich & Strange Thanks Tao, definitely! Please find the fixup at the bottom of this email. I keep the WIP V13 here: https://github.com/balsini/linux/tree/fuse-passthrough-v13-v5.11-rc5 Thanks, Alessio ---8<--- >From 63797a2cc6b3946bce59989adcb8f39f70f27643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alessio Balsini Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 10:58:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: Fix crediantials leak in passthrough read_iter If the system doesn't have enough memory when fuse_passthrough_read_iter is requested in asynchronous IO, an error is directly returned without restoring the caller's credentials. Fix by always ensuring credentials are restored. Fixes: 20210125153057.3623715-8-balsini@android.com ("fuse: Use daemon creds in passthrough mode") Signed-off-by: Alessio Balsini --- fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c index 284979f87747..1df94c1d8a00 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c +++ b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c @@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb_fuse, struct fuse_aio_req *aio_req; aio_req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct fuse_aio_req), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!aio_req) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!aio_req) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } aio_req->iocb_fuse = iocb_fuse; kiocb_clone(&aio_req->iocb, iocb_fuse, passthrough_filp); @@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb_fuse, if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) fuse_aio_cleanup_handler(aio_req); } +out: revert_creds(old_cred); return ret; -- 2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog