From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] serial: core: fix suspicious security_locked_down() call
Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 14:27:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YJUyJcNT9RDaJc4P@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210507115719.140799-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
On Fri, May 07, 2021 at 01:57:19PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> The commit that added this check did so in a very strange way - first
> security_locked_down() is called, its value stored into retval, and if
> it's nonzero, then an additional check is made for (change_irq ||
> change_port), and if this is true, the function returns. However, if
> the goto exit branch is not taken, the code keeps the retval value and
> continues executing the function. Then, depending on whether
> uport->ops->verify_port is set, the retval value may or may not be reset
> to zero and eventually the error value from security_locked_down() may
> abort the function a few lines below.
>
> I will go out on a limb and assume that this isn't the intended behavior
> and that an error value from security_locked_down() was supposed to
> abort the function only in case (change_irq || change_port) is true.
Are you _sure_ about this?
Verification from the authors and users of this odd feature might be
good to have, as I am loath to change how this works without them
weighing in here.
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-07 12:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-07 11:57 [PATCH] serial: core: fix suspicious security_locked_down() call Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-05-07 12:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-05-07 12:58 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-05-10 19:36 ` Kees Cook
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