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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] x86/sgx: Add SGX infrastructure to recover from poison
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 23:00:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YQHhd0qKZqMCWqks@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3534daf5-fae5-a85c-e198-c0b73e44ece4@intel.com>

On Wed, Jul 28, 2021, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/28/21 1:46 PM, Tony Luck wrote:
> > +int sgx_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
> > +{
> ...
> > +	page->flags |= SGX_EPC_PAGE_POISON;
> 
> Is this safe outside of any locks?

It's safe outside of sgx_reclaimer_lock iff this can guarantee nothing else can
reach the page.  I'm pretty sure that doesn't hold true here.

> I see the reclaimer doing things like:
> 
>                 epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
> 
> I'd worry that this code and other non-atomic epc_page->flags
> manipulation could trample on each other.
> 
> This might need to some some atomic bit manipulation *and* convert all
> the other epc_page->flags users.

I don't think atomics would be sufficient as that would open all sorts of possible
races.  E.g. this new code in __sgx_sanitize_pages()

                page = list_first_entry(dirty_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);

+               if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_POISON) {
+                       list_del(&page->list);
+                       continue;
+               }
+
		***HERE***
                ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));

could attempt EREMOVE on a freshly POISONed page.  That appears to be "benign"
since ENCLS is wrapped with_ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT, but it feels wrong to add a check
that we know can race.

And similar races for allocation/free could hand out a poisoned page or add one
to the free list.

@@ -585,6 +600,10 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim)

        for ( ; ; ) {
                page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+
+               if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_POISON)
+                       continue;
		*** HERE ***
+


@@ -630,7 +651,8 @@ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
        spin_lock(&node->lock);

        page->owner = NULL;
-       list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
+       if (!(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_POISON))
		*** HERE ***
+               list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);


Setting POISON and hoping we eventually notice doesn't sound robust.  Maybe some
of these races are unavoidable due to the nature of #MC delivery, but I would hope
the kernel can at least avoid handing out a poisoned page to a different enclave.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-28 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-08 18:14 [PATCH 0/4] Basic recovery for machine checks inside SGX Tony Luck
2021-07-08 18:14 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/sgx: Track phase and type of SGX EPC pages Tony Luck
2021-07-09 18:08   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-09 18:09     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-14 20:42   ` Reinette Chatre
2021-07-14 20:59     ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-14 21:21       ` Reinette Chatre
2021-07-14 23:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 23:39           ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-15 15:33             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-08 18:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/sgx: Add basic infrastructure to recover from errors in SGX memory Tony Luck
2021-07-08 18:14 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/sgx: Hook sgx_memory_failure() into mainline code Tony Luck
2021-07-08 18:14 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Basic recovery for machine checks inside SGX Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/sgx: Provide indication of life-cycle of EPC pages Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:28     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-27  2:04     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 2/6] x86/sgx: Add infrastructure to identify SGX " Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/sgx: Initial poison handling for dirty and free pages Tony Luck
2021-07-27  2:08     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 4/6] x86/sgx: Add SGX infrastructure to recover from poison Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/sgx: Hook sgx_memory_failure() into mainline code Tony Luck
2021-07-19 18:20   ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation Tony Luck
2021-07-27  1:54   ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Basic recovery for machine checks inside SGX Sakkinen, Jarkko
2021-07-28 20:46   ` [PATCH v3 0/7] " Tony Luck
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 1/7] x86/sgx: Provide indication of life-cycle of EPC pages Tony Luck
2021-07-28 22:12       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-28 22:57         ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-28 23:12           ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-28 23:32             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-28 23:48               ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-29  0:07                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-29  0:42                   ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-30  0:34           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-30  0:33         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86/sgx: Add infrastructure to identify SGX " Tony Luck
2021-07-28 22:19       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-30  0:38         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-30 16:46           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-30 16:50             ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-30 18:44               ` Luck, Tony
2021-07-30 20:35                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-30 23:35                   ` Luck, Tony
2021-08-03 21:34                     ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-08-03 23:49                       ` Luck, Tony
2021-08-02  8:52                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-02  8:51               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-02  8:48             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 3/7] x86/sgx: Initial poison handling for dirty and free pages Tony Luck
2021-07-30  0:42       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 4/7] x86/sgx: Add SGX infrastructure to recover from poison Tony Luck
2021-07-28 22:29       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-28 23:00         ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 5/7] x86/sgx: Hook sgx_memory_failure() into mainline code Tony Luck
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 6/7] x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation Tony Luck
2021-07-28 20:46     ` [PATCH v3 7/7] x86/sgx: Add documentation for SGX memory errors Tony Luck
2021-08-27 19:55     ` [PATCH v4 0/6] Basic recovery for machine checks inside SGX Tony Luck
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/sgx: Provide indication of life-cycle of EPC pages Tony Luck
2021-09-01  3:55         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/sgx: Add infrastructure to identify SGX " Tony Luck
2021-09-01  4:30         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 3/6] x86/sgx: Initial poison handling for dirty and free pages Tony Luck
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 4/6] x86/sgx: Add SGX infrastructure to recover from poison Tony Luck
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 5/6] x86/sgx: Hook sgx_memory_failure() into mainline code Tony Luck
2021-09-03  6:12         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-03  6:56           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-06 18:51             ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-07 14:07               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-07 14:13                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-07 15:07                   ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-07 15:03                 ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-07 15:08                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-07 17:46                     ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-08  0:59                       ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-08 16:49                         ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-08  2:29                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-27 19:55       ` [PATCH v4 6/6] x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation Tony Luck
2021-08-27 20:28       ` [PATCH v4 0/6] Basic recovery for machine checks inside SGX Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 20:43         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-09-01  2:06       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01 14:48         ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-17 21:38       ` [PATCH v5 0/7] " Tony Luck
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 1/7] x86/sgx: Provide indication of life-cycle of EPC pages Tony Luck
2021-09-21 21:28           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-21 21:34             ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-22  5:17               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-21 22:15             ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-22  5:27               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 2/7] x86/sgx: Add infrastructure to identify SGX " Tony Luck
2021-09-21 20:23           ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-21 20:50             ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-21 22:32               ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-21 23:48                 ` Luck, Tony
2021-09-21 23:50                   ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 3/7] x86/sgx: Initial poison handling for dirty and free pages Tony Luck
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 4/7] x86/sgx: Add SGX infrastructure to recover from poison Tony Luck
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 5/7] x86/sgx: Hook arch_memory_failure() into mainline code Tony Luck
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 6/7] x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation Tony Luck
2021-09-17 21:38         ` [PATCH v5 7/7] x86/sgx: Add check for SGX pages to ghes_do_memory_failure() Tony Luck

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