From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26619C4332F for ; Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:43:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C8C961056 for ; Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:43:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1349655AbhICPoR (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:44:17 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:25278 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349566AbhICPoQ (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:44:16 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1630683795; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=rmz5dxCT3Is+5LUh/Dfik2OQKMSHi9rWSjYepBCE0qk=; b=AOVz9j6wv3p9kagILNYnQFvJRQ/U4Xu8jmIVM2N+I+kPkx6FRW80BM8yA+n2s0gG+WrteI wim2iQgAWuG1diD1vfnhriOOelW+KtgbAfa4eY2WQCXZECOEErNbSFfuSsB1dGGk1jwEjW N8y0tqUE+rcABr0wGREJh8m2jWgdWFQ= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-56-WRLuUvTaPnKLFlvUthyY4g-1; Fri, 03 Sep 2021 11:43:14 -0400 X-MC-Unique: WRLuUvTaPnKLFlvUthyY4g-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ECACC1883527; Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:43:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (unknown [10.22.8.130]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14A091036B3E; Fri, 3 Sep 2021 15:43:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id A454C220257; Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:43:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:43:08 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: Bruce Fields Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher , fstests , linux-fsdevel , LKML , virtio-fs@redhat.com, Daniel Walsh , David Gilbert , Christian Brauner , Casey Schaufler , LSM , selinux@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o , Miklos Szeredi , Giuseppe Scrivano , stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, Dave Chinner , Alexander Viro Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels Message-ID: References: <20210902152228.665959-1-vgoyal@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 10:42:34AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote: > Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS. I > don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of > work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs? > We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing > user.* xattr draft for most of the details. Will be nice if we can support trusted.* xattrs on NFS. Vivek > > --b. > > On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 2:56 AM Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > > > > On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels > > > > > > > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will > > > > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting > > > > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing. > > > > > > It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel > > > change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The > > > user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as > > > the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have > > > applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this > > > change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like > > > backups. > > > > > > I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping > > > security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense, > > > but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a > > > user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior > > > would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If > > > mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need > > > to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of > > > purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs. > > > That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.* > > > xattrs. > > > > Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different > > security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the > > "host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest" > > uses. > > > > Thanks, > > Andreas > > >