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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/17] fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memcpy() at compile-time
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 13:34:50 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YbyR+gt0ku65NJrM@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202112160942.01254B408@keescook>

On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 10:00:09AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 11:08:26AM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 02:33:20PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > memcpy() is dead; long live memcpy()
> > > 
> > > tl;dr: In order to eliminate a large class of common buffer overflow
> > > flaws that continue to persist in the kernel, have memcpy() (under
> > > CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) perform bounds checking of the destination struct
> > > member when they have a known size. This would have caught all of the
> > > memcpy()-related buffer write overflow flaws identified in at least the
> > > last three years.
> > > 
> > 
> > Hi Kees,
> > 
> > Since there's a *lot* of context below, it's very easy to miss some key details
> > (e.g. that the compile-time warnings are limited to W=1 builds). It would be
> > really nice if the summary above could say something like:
> 
> Hm, I do need to write a better summary! I think there's still some
> misunderstanding, and I will attempt some clarity here... :)

Thanks! Sorry if that came across as a complaint; this looks really useful and
I just couldn't figure out if I was holding things wrong or whether I was
hitting an unexpected issue. :)

> >   This patch makes it possible to detect when memcpy() of a struct member may
> >   go past the bounds of that member. When CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y, runtime
> >   checks are always emitted where the compiler cannot guarantee a memcpy() is
> >   safely bounded, and compile-time warnings are enabled for W=1 builds.
> 
> For GCC and Clang 14, compile-time _write_ overflow warnings are meant
> to be emitted under FORTIFY_SOURCE. _read_ overflow warnings are meant
> to be emitted under FORTIFY_SOURCE + W=1 (or when the same statement
> also has a write overflow).

Cool.

I'll await a clang 14 release, or go build my own copy in the mean time.

> >   This catches a large class of common buffer overflow flaws, and would have
> >   caught all of the memcpy()-related buffer write overflow flaws identified in
> >   the last three years.
> > 
> > As an aside, since W=1 is chock-full of (IMO useless) warnings, is there any
> > way to enable *just* the FORTIFY_SOURCE warnings?
> 
> To see them all (i.e. not shove some into W=1), you can remove the "W=1
> or write overflow" part of the read overflow test in fortify-string.h.
> e.g.:
> 
> -                if ((IS_ENABLED(KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1) || p_size_field < size) &&
> -                    q_size_field < size)
> +                if (q_size_field < size)
> 
> > I had a go at testing this on arm64, and could get build-time warnings from GCC
> > 11.1.0, but not from Clang 13.0.0.
> 
> This is correct and expected due to Clang 13's lack of support for
> compiletime_warning().

Thanks for confirming!

Thanks,
Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-17 13:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-13 22:33 [PATCH 00/17] Enable strict compile-time memcpy() fortify checks Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 01/17] KVM: x86: Replace memset() "optimization" with normal per-field writes Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 02/17] net/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy() Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 03/17] net/mlx5e: Use struct_group() for memcpy() region Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 04/17] media: omap3isp: " Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 05/17] sata_fsl: " Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 06/17] fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memcpy() at compile-time Kees Cook
2021-12-16 11:08   ` Mark Rutland
2021-12-16 11:21     ` Mark Rutland
2021-12-16 18:00     ` Kees Cook
2021-12-17 13:34       ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 07/17] fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memmove() " Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 08/17] ath11k: Use memset_startat() for clearing queue descriptors Kees Cook
2021-12-14  6:02   ` Kalle Valo
2021-12-14 15:46     ` Kalle Valo
2021-12-14 17:05       ` Kees Cook
2021-12-16 13:50         ` Kalle Valo
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 09/17] RDMA/mlx5: Use memset_after() to zero struct mlx5_ib_mr Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 10/17] drbd: Use struct_group() to zero algs Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 11/17] dm integrity: Use struct_group() to zero struct journal_sector Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 12/17] iw_cxgb4: Use memset_startat() for cpl_t5_pass_accept_rpl Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 13/17] intel_th: msu: Use memset_startat() for clearing hw header Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 14/17] IB/mthca: Use memset_startat() for clearing mpt_entry Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 15/17] scsi: lpfc: Use struct_group() to initialize struct lpfc_cgn_info Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 16/17] fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memset() at compile-time Kees Cook
2021-12-13 22:33 ` [PATCH 17/17] fortify: Work around Clang inlining bugs Kees Cook
2021-12-15  0:26 ` [PATCH 00/17] Enable strict compile-time memcpy() fortify checks Jason Gunthorpe
2021-12-17  4:04 ` Martin K. Petersen

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