From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
llvm@lists.linux.dev, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 11:45:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YfQ54x8zglPT/YnL@dev-arch.archlinux-ax161> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220128114446.740575-1-elver@google.com>
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 12:44:45PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> The randomize_kstack_offset feature is unconditionally compiled in when
> the architecture supports it.
>
> To add constraints on compiler versions, we require a dedicated Kconfig
> variable. Therefore, introduce RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET.
>
> Furthermore, this option is now also configurable by EXPERT kernels:
> while the feature is supposed to have zero performance overhead when
> disabled, due to its use of static branches, there are few cases where
> giving a distribution the option to disable the feature entirely makes
> sense. For example, in very resource constrained environments, which
> would never enable the feature to begin with, in which case the
> additional kernel code size increase would be redundant.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
From a Kconfig perspective:
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
> include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 5 +++++
> init/main.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 678a80713b21..2cde48d9b77c 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -1159,16 +1159,29 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless
> of the static branch state.
>
> -config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
> - bool "Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry"
> +config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> + bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT
> + default y
> depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> help
> The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
> roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
> attacks that depend on stack address determinism or
> - cross-syscall address exposures. This feature is controlled
> - by kernel boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this
> - config chooses the default boot state.
> + cross-syscall address exposures.
> +
> + The feature is controlled via the "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off"
> + kernel boot param, and if turned off has zero overhead due to its use
> + of static branches (see JUMP_LABEL).
> +
> + If unsure, say Y.
> +
> +config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
> + bool "Default state of kernel stack offset randomization"
> + depends on RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> + help
> + Kernel stack offset randomization is controlled by kernel boot param
> + "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this config chooses the default
> + boot state.
>
> config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
> def_bool n
> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> index bebc911161b6..91f1b990a3c3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
> #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
> #define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/jump_label.h>
> #include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
> @@ -50,5 +51,9 @@ void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
> raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \
> } \
> } while (0)
> +#else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
> +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { } while (0)
> +#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { } while (0)
> +#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
>
> #endif
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> index 65fa2e41a9c0..560f45c27ffe 100644
> --- a/init/main.c
> +++ b/init/main.c
> @@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
> pti_init();
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
> randomize_kstack_offset);
> DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
> --
> 2.35.0.rc0.227.g00780c9af4-goog
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-28 18:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-28 11:44 [PATCH 1/2] stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET Marco Elver
2022-01-28 11:44 ` [PATCH 2/2] stack: Constrain stack offset randomization with Clang builds Marco Elver
2022-01-28 18:55 ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-01-28 19:14 ` Marco Elver
2022-01-28 19:10 ` Kees Cook
2022-01-28 19:23 ` Marco Elver
2022-01-28 19:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-01-28 18:45 ` Nathan Chancellor [this message]
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