From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>,
Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com>,
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] Fix arm64 kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 15:11:08 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yk/eFBCqBTu4eZf2@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <83b3583f35c50c609739a8d857d14e8410293373.1644953683.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Hi,
On 02/15/22 at 08:39pm, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> commit d3bfe84129f6 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically")
> split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and
> .secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by
> keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd.
>
> Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to
> verify_pefile_signature().
>
> Cherry-picked from
> commit ea93102f3224 ("Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot")
This line may need a line feed?
The patch 1~3 looks good to me. Coiby encountered the same issue
on arm64, and has posted a patch series to fix that and there's clean up
and code adjustment.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220401013118.348084-1-coxu@redhat.com/T/#u
Hi Coiby,
Maybe you can check this patchset, and consider how to integrate your
patches based on this patch 1~/3?
For this patch itself, ack.
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
>
> Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: stable@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> index 9ec34690e255..1fbf2ee7c005 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> {
> - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
> + return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> }
> #endif
> --
> 2.31.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-08 7:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-15 19:39 [PATCH 0/4] Unifrom keyring support across architectures and functions Michal Suchanek
2022-02-15 19:39 ` [PATCH 1/4] Fix arm64 kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot Michal Suchanek
2022-04-06 15:41 ` joeyli
2022-04-08 7:11 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2022-02-15 19:39 ` [PATCH 2/4] kexec, KEYS, arm64: Make use of platform keyring for signature verification Michal Suchanek
2022-04-06 15:45 ` joeyli
2022-02-15 19:39 ` [PATCH 3/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary " Michal Suchanek
2022-04-06 15:46 ` joeyli
2022-02-15 19:39 ` [PATCH 4/4] module, KEYS: Make use of platform " Michal Suchanek
2022-02-15 20:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-15 20:47 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-02-15 22:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-16 10:56 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-02-16 11:04 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-02-16 11:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-16 12:09 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-03-22 17:37 ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-03-22 18:55 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-03-28 10:15 ` joeyli
2022-03-28 13:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-03-28 14:03 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-03-28 14:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-28 16:29 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-08 7:47 ` [PATCH 0/4] Unifrom keyring support across architectures and functions Coiby Xu
2022-04-08 8:51 ` Michal Suchánek
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