Re: [PATCH v3] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init

[Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>]

Am Wed, May 04, 2022 at 01:16:44PM +0200 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> Before, the first 64 bytes of input, regardless of how entropic it was,
> would be used to mutate the crng base key directly, and none of those
> bytes would be credited as having entropy. Then 256 bits of credited
> input would be accumulated, and only then would the rng transition from
> the earlier "fast init" phase into being actually initialized.
> 
> The thinking was that by mixing and matching fast init and real init, an
> attacker who compromised the fast init state, considered easy to do
> given how little entropy might be in those first 64 bytes, would then be
> able to bruteforce bits from the actual initialization. By keeping these
> separate, bruteforcing became impossible.
> 
> However, by not crediting potentially creditable bits from those first 64
> bytes of input, we delay initialization, and actually make the problem
> worse, because it means the user is drawing worse random numbers for a
> longer period of time.
> 
> Instead, we can take the first 128 bits as fast init, and allow them to
> be credited, and then hold off on the next 128 bits until they've
> accumulated. This is still a wide enough margin to prevent bruteforcing
> the rng state, while still initializing much faster.
> 
> Then, rather than trying to piecemeal inject into the base crng key at
> various points, instead just extract from the pool when we need it, for
> the crng_init==0 phase. Performance may even be better for the various
> inputs here, since there are likely more calls to mix_pool_bytes() then
> there are to get_random_bytes() during this phase of system execution.

Have you evaluated this closer, also for systems where it takes ages to
reach crng_init = 1? And might it make sense to only call extract_entropy()
if there has been new input between two calls to get_random_bytes()?

Thanks,
	Dominik