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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vadim Galitsin <vadim.galitsyn@oracle.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>,
	Vadim Galitsin <vadim.galitsyn@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 13:14:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YoTVIGiXUO2l8Czm@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YoRFjTIzMYZu8Hq8@zx2c4.com>

Hi Vadim,

On Wed, May 18, 2022 at 03:02:05AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Observation: the problem is definitely related to using the FPU in a
> hard IRQ.

I wrote a tiny reproducer that should be pretty reliable for testing
this, attached below. I think this proves my working theory. Run this in
a VirtualBox VM, and then move your mouse around or hit the keyboard, or
do something that triggers the add_{input,disk}_randomness() path from a
hardirq handler. On my laptop, for example, the trackpoint goes via
hardirq, but the touchpad does not. As soon as I move the trackpoint
around, the below program prints "XSAVE is borked!".

Also, note that this isn't just "corruption" of the guest VM, but also
leaking secret contents of the host VM into the guest. So you might
really want to make sure VirtualBox issues a fix for this before 5.18,
as it's arguably security sensitive.

Regards,
Jason


#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	int status = 0;

	for (int i = 0, nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); i < nproc; ++i) {
		if (!fork()) {
			prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
			asm("movq $42, %%rax\n"
			    "movq %%rax, %%xmm0\n"
			    "0:\n"
			    "movq %%xmm0, %%rbx\n"
			    "cmpq %%rax, %%rbx\n"
			    "je 0b\n"
			    : : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0", "cc");
			_exit(77);
		}
	}
	wait(&status);
	if (WEXITSTATUS(status) == 77)
		printf("XSAVE is borked!\n");
	return 1;
}

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-18 11:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-01 19:31 [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 1/3] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-05  0:42   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 2/3] x86/fpu: Rename irq_fpu_usable() Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 3/3] x86/fpu: Make FPU protection more robust Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-02 15:58     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-03  9:06       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-04 15:36         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 15:55           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 16:45             ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 19:05               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 21:04                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 23:52                   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05  0:55                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05  1:11                       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05  1:21                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05 11:02                           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:34                             ` David Laight
2022-05-05 11:35                               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:53                                 ` David Laight
2022-05-06 22:34                               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-07 13:50                                 ` David Laight
2022-05-05 13:48                             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-06 22:15                 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-03  9:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-02 10:02 ` [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption Filipe Manana
2022-05-02 12:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-04 15:40 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18  1:02   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 11:14     ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-05-18 11:18       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 13:09     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18 14:08       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-25 20:36         ` Jason A. Donenfeld

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