From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 059B5ECAAA1 for ; Tue, 6 Sep 2022 08:58:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234158AbiIFI60 (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Sep 2022 04:58:26 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56238 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232511AbiIFI6X (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Sep 2022 04:58:23 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A97124BC1; Tue, 6 Sep 2022 01:58:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 87B6461470; Tue, 6 Sep 2022 08:58:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6FEA1C433D6; Tue, 6 Sep 2022 08:58:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1662454701; bh=GKNX2gt6lOvmJQO/ERaU3bZz9S3yTumOoy5DxUyuK/A=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=pk6sYDdRlp77tXXTE5MtkGgok1ah8PYhtmwTHLFuIOnWdHmTmxq24rK1JGxKeIPe8 91ThLSb7kYrRZNIG6SUHXlBkirhoFS+TArF2VEdHCHsC3o3XM6QzdX5+MW1w0Lo4rN QV3nAsXPbJz9KKxGOXCeiqtqQxZ3p+mEIbTeRJ37ocggO8NqCrDlxXZ7aP62GoQbDJ gL1RybP4uxC6lpack7j0r7vM7m+wtgh6qyJ0dQl96yB5O1BgxLMssBJ/5gdT5xbA8l w9LbnvS0G4HAQ4hR/i6D8JSTnx/xlVt7Fqe96m1IjUWovJT2Gry9wyveZGS+H13nc0 nt5bmsJOfW5dQ== Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 11:58:17 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Pankaj Gupta Cc: a.fatoum@pengutronix.de, Jason@zx2c4.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, sumit.garg@linaro.org, david@sigma-star.at, michael@walle.cc, john.ernberg@actia.se, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, j.luebbe@pengutronix.de, ebiggers@kernel.org, richard@nod.at, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, sahil.malhotra@nxp.com, kshitiz.varshney@nxp.com, horia.geanta@nxp.com, V.Sethi@nxp.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY Message-ID: References: <20220906065157.10662-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220906065157.10662-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 06, 2022 at 12:21:49PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote: > Hardware Bound key(HBK), is never acessible as plain key outside of the ~~~~~~~~~ accesible. > hardware boundary. Thus, it is un-usable, even if somehow fetched > from kernel memory. It ensures run-time security. Why is it called "HBK" here and "hw" in the context of keyctl? > This patchset adds generic support for classing the Hardware Bound Key, > based on: > > - Newly added flag-'is_hbk', added to the tfm. > > Consumer of the kernel crypto api, after allocating > the transformation, sets this flag based on the basis > of the type of key consumer has. > > - This helps to influence the core processing logic > for the encapsulated algorithm. > > - This flag is set by the consumer after allocating > the tfm and before calling the function crypto_xxx_setkey(). > > First implementation is based on CAAM. CAAM is implementation of what exactly? I'm sorry but I don't know your definition of unusable. BR, Jarkko