From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/35] prctl: Add flag for shadow stack writeability and push/pop
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 17:47:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a236d8bb1593035252f7094b6461e4d2c5b432a1.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230716-arm64-gcs-v1-2-bf567f93bba6@kernel.org>
On Sun, 2023-07-16 at 22:50 +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On arm64 and x86 the kernel can control if there is write access to
> the
> shadow stack via specific instructions defined for the purpose,
> useful
> for things like userspace threading at the expense of some security.
> Add a flag to allow this to be selected when changing the shadow
> stack
> status.
>
> On arm64 the kernel can separately control if userspace is able to
> pop
> and push values directly onto the shadow stack via GCS push and pop
> instructions, supporting many scenarios where userspace needs to
> write
> to the stack with less security exposure than full write access. Add
> a
> flag to allow this to be selected when changing the shadow stack
> status.
Is this correct? I thought Szabolcs was saying pop was always
supported, but push was optional.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-18 17:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-16 21:50 [PATCH 00/35] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS at EL0 Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH 01/35] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2023-07-18 17:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-18 18:54 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH 02/35] prctl: Add flag for shadow stack writeability and push/pop Mark Brown
2023-07-18 17:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2023-07-18 19:10 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH 03/35] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 04/35] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2023-07-17 11:42 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-07-19 11:44 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-07-19 13:25 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-19 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 05/35] arm64/sysreg: Add new system registers for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 06/35] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 07/35] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 08/35] arm64/gcs: Provide copy_to_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 09/35] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 10/35] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 11/35] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 12/35] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 13/35] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 14/35] arm64: Disable traps for GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 15/35] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 16/35] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 17/35] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2023-07-17 12:12 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 18/35] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 19/35] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS registers for EL0 Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 20/35] arm64/gcs: Allocate a new GCS for threads with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 21/35] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2023-07-18 17:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-18 19:37 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 22/35] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2023-07-18 9:10 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-07-18 13:55 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-18 15:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 23/35] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 24/35] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 25/35] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 26/35] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-17 12:32 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 27/35] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 28/35] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 29/35] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 30/35] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 31/35] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 32/35] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 33/35] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 34/35] selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-16 21:51 ` [PATCH 35/35] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
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