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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>,
	"hillf.zj" <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 15:58:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a2bdb3cf3a1d70c26980d7c6dddfbaa69f3182bf.1414190806.git.luto@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1414190806.git.luto@amacapital.net>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1414190806.git.luto@amacapital.net>

We currently allow any process to use rdpmc.  This significantly
weakens the protection offered by PR_TSC_DISABLED, and it could be
helpful to users attempting to exploit timing attacks.

Since we can't enable access to individual counters, use a very
coarse heuristic to limit access to rdpmc: allow access only when
a perf_event is mmapped.  This protects seccomp sandboxes.

There is plenty of room to further tighen these restrictions.  For
example, this allows rdpmc for any x86_pmu event, but it's only
useful for self-monitoring tasks.

As a side effect, cap_user_rdpmc will now be false for AMD uncore
events.  This isn't a real regression, since .event_idx is disabled
for these events anyway for the time being.  Whenever that gets
re-added, the cap_user_rdpmc code can be adjusted or refactored
accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 16 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c   | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h   |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 876e74e8eec7..09b9620a73b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	struct mutex lock;
 	void __user *vdso;
+
+	atomic_t perf_rdpmc_allowed;	/* nonzero if rdpmc is allowed */
 } mm_context_t;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 23697f74b372..ccad8d616038 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -19,6 +19,18 @@ static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
 }
 #endif	/* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
+	else
+		cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
+}
+#else
+static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Used for LDT copy/destruction.
  */
@@ -53,6 +65,9 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 		/* Stop flush ipis for the previous mm */
 		cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(prev));
 
+		/* Load per-mm CR4 state */
+		load_mm_cr4(next);
+
 		/*
 		 * Load the LDT, if the LDT is different.
 		 *
@@ -88,6 +103,7 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 			 */
 			load_cr3(next->pgd);
 			trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+			load_mm_cr4(next);
 			load_LDT_nolock(&next->context);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
index 00fbab7aa587..3e875b3b30f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/nmi.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/timer.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -1336,8 +1337,6 @@ x86_pmu_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
 		break;
 
 	case CPU_STARTING:
-		if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
-			cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
 		if (x86_pmu.cpu_starting)
 			x86_pmu.cpu_starting(cpu);
 		break;
@@ -1813,14 +1812,44 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 			event->destroy(event);
 	}
 
+	if (ACCESS_ONCE(x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc))
+		event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED;
+
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void refresh_pce(void *ignored)
+{
+	if (current->mm)
+		load_mm_cr4(current->mm);
+}
+
+static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
+		return;
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&current->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed) == 1)
+		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	if (!current->mm)
+		return;
+
+	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
+		return;
+
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&current->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
+		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+}
+
 static int x86_pmu_event_idx(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	int idx = event->hw.idx;
 
-	if (!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
+	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed && idx >= INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
@@ -1838,16 +1867,6 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
 	return snprintf(buf, 40, "%d\n", x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc);
 }
 
-static void change_rdpmc(void *info)
-{
-	bool enable = !!(unsigned long)info;
-
-	if (enable)
-		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
-	else
-		cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
-}
-
 static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
 			      struct device_attribute *attr,
 			      const char *buf, size_t count)
@@ -1862,11 +1881,7 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
 	if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc_broken)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!!val != !!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc) {
-		x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
-		on_each_cpu(change_rdpmc, (void *)val, 1);
-	}
-
+	x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
 	return count;
 }
 
@@ -1909,6 +1924,9 @@ static struct pmu pmu = {
 
 	.event_init		= x86_pmu_event_init,
 
+	.event_mapped		= x86_pmu_event_mapped,
+	.event_unmapped		= x86_pmu_event_unmapped,
+
 	.add			= x86_pmu_add,
 	.del			= x86_pmu_del,
 	.start			= x86_pmu_start,
@@ -1930,7 +1948,8 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event,
 
 	userpg->cap_user_time = 0;
 	userpg->cap_user_time_zero = 0;
-	userpg->cap_user_rdpmc = x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc;
+	userpg->cap_user_rdpmc =
+		!!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED);
 	userpg->pmc_width = x86_pmu.cntval_bits;
 
 	if (!sched_clock_stable())
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
index d98a34d435d7..f6868186e67b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct event_constraint {
 #define PERF_X86_EVENT_COMMITTED	0x8 /* event passed commit_txn */
 #define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_LD_HSW	0x10 /* haswell style datala, load */
 #define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_NA_HSW	0x20 /* haswell style datala, unknown */
+#define PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED	0x40 /* grant rdpmc permission */
+
 
 struct amd_nb {
 	int nb_id;  /* NorthBridge id */
-- 
1.9.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-10-24 22:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-10-24 22:58 [PATCH v2 0/8] CR4 handling improvements Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] perf: Clean up pmu::event_idx Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86: Clean up cr4 manipulation Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 19:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-02-04 14:41   ` [tip:perf/x86] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86: Store a per-cpu shadow copy of CR4 Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 19:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-02-04 14:41   ` [tip:perf/x86] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86: Add a comment clarifying LDT context switching Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 19:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-02-04 14:41   ` [tip:perf/x86] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] perf: Add pmu callbacks to track event mapping and unmapping Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 19:59   ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-11-01 20:32     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 20:39       ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-11-01 21:49         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-01 22:10           ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-11-02 20:15             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 14:42   ` [tip:perf/x86] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] perf: Pass the event to arch_perf_update_userpage Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 14:42   ` [tip:perf/x86] perf: Pass the event to arch_perf_update_userpage( ) tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2014-10-31 17:54   ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped Paolo Bonzini
2014-10-31 18:25     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 14:42   ` [tip:perf/x86] perf/x86: " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86, perf: Add /sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc=2 to allow rdpmc for all tasks Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 14:43   ` [tip:perf/x86] perf/x86: Add /sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc= 2 " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-31 15:09 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] CR4 handling improvements Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-31 17:09   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-14  0:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 22:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-01-23  8:37       ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-11-12 23:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-27  7:16 [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped 张静(长谷)
2014-10-27 15:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-28  3:35   ` Hillf Danton
2014-10-28  3:57     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-28  4:07       ` Hillf Danton
2014-10-28  4:27         ` Andy Lutomirski

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