From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261653AbVFVRAw (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 13:00:52 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261630AbVFVQ4x (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 12:56:53 -0400 Received: from wproxy.gmail.com ([64.233.184.198]:54351 "EHLO wproxy.gmail.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261587AbVFVQ4L convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jun 2005 12:56:11 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:reply-to:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=ecjStPTlvVh5DpdV4TsgHZpIbSF6y22/QmGimMoRHZRRBWfb0eGv+Ztiz8+4x/WJZTm1aX9o3nPMaaDv16GeGfADXBNdusgZ2CaoqYOtHasV5MWSbv80fo8YwE+03LWge1JhJpawYqx3O7swsvtQwFdMCSQug75v1YBQMDs6/OA= Message-ID: Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 11:56:06 -0500 From: Eric Van Hensbergen Reply-To: Eric Van Hensbergen To: Alan Cox Subject: Re: -mm -> 2.6.13 merge status (fuse) Cc: Pavel Machek , Miklos Szeredi , akpm@osdl.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List In-Reply-To: <1119458579.11528.93.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Disposition: inline References: <20050620235458.5b437274.akpm@osdl.org> <20050621142820.GC2015@openzaurus.ucw.cz> <20050621220619.GC2815@elf.ucw.cz> <20050622150839.GB1881@elf.ucw.cz> <1119458579.11528.93.camel@localhost.localdomain> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 6/22/05, Alan Cox wrote: > > 1) only allow user's to mount/bind on directories/files where they > > have unconditional write access. > > Like say /tmp. Build a bizarre behaving /tmp and I can do funky stuff > with some third party suid apps. Its a good start but you probably want > a stronger policy and one enforced by the user space side not kernel (eg > "Below ~") > Well in the original discussions Miklos had classified directories that had the sticky bit set (such as /tmp) as out-of-bounds for user-mounts. However, its a point well taken. I had originally proposed having some sort of a policy file (sort of like an extended fstab with regular expressions) to give more granular control over where users could and couldn't mount (along with what types of devices, network servers, and file systems they could mount from). However, this leans more towards the "super-mount" suid-application which I think many found undesirable. An alternative would be some way for the kernel to consult with an application about different mount policies. I don't know what the right thing is here. > > 2) enforce NOSUID mount options on user-mounts > > 2 is unneccessarily crude. Just enforce suid owner/owner group. > I'm dense this morning, not sure what you mean here. -eric