From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62B75C32750 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:44:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 422B4214AE for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:44:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726751AbfHCOoq (ORCPT ); Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:44:46 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:31834 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725844AbfHCOop (ORCPT ); Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:44:45 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 03 Aug 2019 07:44:44 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,342,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="164212471" Received: from xinpan-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com ([10.249.33.239]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 03 Aug 2019 07:44:39 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Tyler Hicks Cc: Roberto Sassu , jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jgg@ziepe.ca, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@gmail.com, nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com, silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:44:37 +0300 In-Reply-To: <20190802202343.GE26616@elm> References: <20190705163735.11539-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> <20190711194811.rfsohbfc3a7carpa@linux.intel.com> <20190801163215.mfkagoafkxscesne@linux.intel.com> <20190802142721.GA26616@elm> <20190802194226.oiztvme5klkmw6fh@linux.intel.com> <20190802202343.GE26616@elm> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.32.1-2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 2019-08-02 at 15:23 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote: > That wasn't the conclusion that I came to. I prefer Robert's proposed > change to trusted.ko. > > How do you propose that this be fixed in eCryptfs? > > Removing encrypted_key support from eCryptfs is the only way that I can > see to fix the bug in eCryptfs. That support has been there since 2011. > I'm not sure of the number of users that would be broken by removing > encrypted_key support. I don't think the number is high but I can't say > that confidently. Looking at the documentation [1] it is stated that "Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for encryption/decryption." Why would you need to remove support for encrypted keys? Isn't it a regression in encrypted keys to hard depend on trusted keys given what the documentation says? > Roberto, what was your use case when you added encrypted_key support to > eCryptfs back then? Are you aware of any users of eCryptfs + > encrypted_keys? > > Jarkko, removing a long-standing feature is potentially more disruptive > to users than adding a workaround to trusted.ko which already requires a > similar workaround. I don't think that I agree with you on the proper > fix here. There is nothing to disagree or agree. I just try to get the picture since ecryptfs is relatively alien to me. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html /Jarkko